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 Abstract 
Prevention of criminal activities, especially but not only of possible terrorist attacks, is 
of high importance for society. The attack on the World Trade Center in the U.S. on 
September 11, 2001, evolved in high investments towards aviation security. Several new 
technologies, such as liquid explosives detection systems and body scanners were 
implemented. However, apart from new technologies, human factors were also taken into 
account: The development of training and selection tools for baggage screeners as well as 
humans’ abilities to infer other’s intentions based on nonverbal behavioral cues were 
considered as possible prevention tool. So-called behavior detection programs were 
implemented, which are based on the assumptions that behavior detection officers are able to 
infer hidden criminal and terroristic intentions during the build-up phase of the criminal or 
terroristic act, using nonverbal behavior as cues. The aim of this thesis was to investigate a) 
whether such hidden criminal intentions during the build-up phase are recognizable in 
nonverbal behavioral cues, b) whether observers are able to detect such intentions during the 
build-up phase based on nonverbal behavioral cues, and c) whether the detection of hidden 
criminal intentions is trainable. 
In the first reported study, five groups of participants (students of psychology, police 
recruits, inexperienced police officers, experienced police officers and criminal investigators) 
were examined in order to investigate whether hidden criminal intentions can be detected 
during the build-up phase, and whether theoretical knowledge and work experience influence 
this detection performance positively. To this end, all participants answered a computer-based 
test containing authentic CCTV recordings of the build-up phase of real baggage thefts at a 
large international airport. The results indicate that shortly before the theft happens, detection 
of hidden criminal intention based on nonverbal behavioral cues is possible even for 
laypeople. Nevertheless, theoretical knowledge alone already improves detection performance 
 impressively at all three measured points during the build-up phase. Special work experience 
of criminal investigators then improves performance even more. Thus, the results of this study 
indicate that the detection of hidden criminal intentions during the build-up phase based on 
nonverbal behavioral cues is indeed possible and that it might be trainable. 
The second study was then conducted to address the question which nonverbal 
behavioral cues are relevant for the detection of hidden criminal intentions during the build-up 
phase, thus allowing such performance as observed in the first study. In order to control for 
inter-individual differences, own recordings of the same people in a search (control) condition 
and a mock crime (test) condition were created. Two groups of participants who were naïve 
about the actual goal of the study analyzed these recordings according to the behaviors of 
interest (Experiments 1 and 2). Experiment 1 was conducted to investigate differences in 
moving patterns in public spaces and communication behavior between offenders and non-
offenders. Additionally to the created recordings, ten authentic CCTV recordings from the 
first study were used to test ecological validity. The observed behaviors of interest were 
compared to the baseline (i.e. how strongly this behavior is expected to be expressed from 
people without hidden criminal intentions in the same situation) as well as between the three 
conditions (search, mock crime, and real crime). In Experiment 2, self- and object-adaptors 
between the search and the mock crime conditions were examined as the behaviors of interest. 
The results of both experiments revealed significant differences in offender and non-offender 
behavior. Moreover, they clearly pointed to the relevance of the construct baseline and the 
need to judge clusters of nonverbal behavior such as moving patterns instead of focusing on 
individual explicit behaviors such as abrupt changes in direction.  
Taken together, the results of both studies reported in this thesis clearly indicate that 
the implementation of behavior detection programs might be a reasonable way of crime-
prevention programs.  
 Zusammenfassung 
Die Prävention von kriminellen und insbesondere terroristischen Aktivitäten ist für die 
Sicherheit der Gesellschaft von grosser Bedeutung. Nach dem Anschlag auf das World Trade 
Center in den USA am 11. September 2001 wurde viel in die Verbesserung der 
Flughafensicherheit investiert. Neben der Implementierung neuer Technologien wie 
beispielsweise Detektionsgeräte für Flüssigsprengstoffe oder Ganzkörperscanner wurde dabei 
auch vermehrt Aufmerksamkeit auf die sogenannten human factors gerichtet. Dies führte zur 
Entwicklung und Einführung von Auswahl- sowie Trainingsverfahren für 
Gepäckkontrollpersonal. Zudem wurden sogenannte Verhaltenserkennungsprogramme 
eingeführt. Diese basieren auf der Annahme, dass kriminelle oder terroristische Intentionen 
bereits vor der eigentlichen Tat anhand des nonverbalen Verhaltens erkannt werden können. 
Das Ziel dieser Dissertation war, wissenschaftlich zu überprüfen, ob versteckte kriminelle 
Intentionen während der Vortatphase tatsächlich im nonverbalen Verhalten sichtbar werden 
und ob Beobachter auch wirklich in der Lage sind, diese zu erkennen. Zusätzlich sollten erste 
Hinweise auf eine mögliche Lern- und Trainierbarkeit dieser Verhaltenserkennung gefunden 
werden. 
Um herauszufinden, ob versteckte kriminelle Intentionen während der Vortatphase 
erkannt werden können und welchen Einfluss Theorie- und Erfahrungswissen auf diese 
Erkennungsleistung haben, wurden in der ersten Studie fünf Gruppen von Teilnehmenden 
untersucht (Psychologiestudierende, Polizeirekruten, unerfahrene Polizisten, erfahrene 
Polizisten und Kriminalpolizisten). Alle Gruppen absolvierten einen eigens dafür 
entwickelten computerbasierten Test, der authentisches Videomaterial von 
Überwachungskameras enthielt, welches die Vortatphase erfolgreicher Gepäckdiebstähle 
zeigte. Die Resultate der Studie zeigen, dass das Erkennen von kriminellen Intentionen 
während der Vortatphase am nonverbalen Verhalten tatsächlich möglich ist. Wie der 
 Messzeitpunkt kurz vor der Tat zeigte, sind bereits Laien (Psychologiestudierende und 
Polizeirekruten) dazu fähig kriminelle Intentionen zu erkennen. Das theoretische Wissen von 
unerfahrenen Polizisten führte zu einer deutlichen Verbesserung der Erkennungsleistung zu 
allen drei Messzeitpunkten während der Vortatphase, welche nur durch das explizite 
Erfahrungswissen von Kriminalpolizisten übertroffen wurde. Diese Ergebnisse stärken die 
Annahme der Trainier- und Lernbarkeit dieser Fähigkeit. 
Die zweite Studie widmete sich der Frage, welche nonverbalen Verhaltensweisen 
während der Vortatphase konkret Hinweise auf versteckte kriminelle Intentionen liefern. Um 
inter-individuelle Unterschiede im nonverbalen Verhalten zu kontrollieren, wurden eigene 
Videoaufnahmen von denselben Personen in einer Kontrollsuchbedingung und einer 
gestellten Tatbedingung erstellt. Zur Überprüfung der ökologischen Validität dieses 
Videomaterials wurden zehn Videos aus der ersten Studie mitanalysiert. Zwei Laiengruppen, 
die nicht über den Hintergrund der Studie informiert waren, analysierten die Videos anhand 
der vorgegebenen Verhaltensweisengruppen (Experiment 1 und Experiment 2). In Experiment 
1 wurden die Verhaltensweisengruppen Bewegungen im Raum und Kommunikations-
verhalten genauer untersucht. In Experiment 2 wurde auf die Verhaltensweisengruppen 
Objekt- und Selbstadaptoren fokussiert. Die Ergebnisse dieser Studie zeigen, dass es beim 
Vergleich des nonverbalen Verhaltens zwischen Tätern und Nichttätern Unterschiede gibt. 
Zusätzlich zeigte sich anhand der Daten die Wichtigkeit des Vergleichs mit einer Baseline 
(Wie stark kann erwartet werden, dass dieses Verhalten von anderen Personen ohne 
Tatabsicht in derselben Situation am selben Ort gezeigt wird?). Zudem ist es vorteilhafter, 
Cluster von Verhaltensweisen wie beispielsweise Bewegungen im Raum anstelle von 
expliziten einzelnen Verhaltensweisen (z.B. abrupte Richtungswechsel) zu beurteilen.  
 Die Ergebnisse der Studien, die in dieser Dissertation dargestellt werden, deuten 
darauf hin, dass sich Verhaltenserkennungsprogramme zur Unterstützung von 
Präventionsarbeit gegen kriminelle Aktivitäten eignen. 
  
   
 Content 
1  Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 11 
1.1 Background ................................................................................................................. 11 
1.1.1 Behavior detection and its role in security ..................................................... 14 
1.1.2  Hidden intentions expressed in nonverbal behavior ...................................... 17 
1.2 Empirical studies ......................................................................................................... 20 
2  “Who’s the thief?” ............................................................................................................. 25 
2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 27 
2.2 Method ........................................................................................................................ 34 
2.2.1  Participants ..................................................................................................... 34 
2.2.2  Materials ........................................................................................................ 35 
2.2.3  Procedure ....................................................................................................... 36 
2.3 Results ......................................................................................................................... 37 
2.2.1  Hits and false alarms ...................................................................................... 38 
2.2.2  Detection performance, d’ ............................................................................. 40 
2.2.3  Response tendency, C .................................................................................... 42 
2.4 Discussion ................................................................................................................... 43 
3  What is suspicious when trying to be inconspicuous? ....................................................... 53 
3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 55 
3.2 General method ........................................................................................................... 63 
3.2.1  Used scenarios ............................................................................................... 63 
3.2.2  Actors and cover story ................................................................................... 64 
3.2.3  Video recordings ............................................................................................ 65 
3.3 Experiment 1 – Moving patterns and communication behavior ................................. 67 
3.3.1  Participants ..................................................................................................... 67 
3.3.2  Stimuli ............................................................................................................ 67 
 3.3.3  Procedure ....................................................................................................... 68 
3.3.4  Results ............................................................................................................ 69 
3.4 Experiment 2 – Object-adaptors and self-adaptors ..................................................... 76 
3.4.1  Participants ..................................................................................................... 76 
3.4.2  Stimuli ............................................................................................................ 76 
3.4.3  Procedure ....................................................................................................... 77 
3.4.4  Results ............................................................................................................ 78 
3.5 Discussion ................................................................................................................... 81 
4  General Discussion ............................................................................................................ 91 
4.1 Summary ..................................................................................................................... 91 
4.2 Future directions ......................................................................................................... 93 
4.3 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 96 
5  References .......................................................................................................................... 97
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
11   
 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
After the attack on September, 11, 2001, (9/11) when four hijacked airplanes crashed 
into several important buildings on U.S. grounds, the public was paralyzed (BBC News, 
2001). This horrendous, but at the same time impressively planned, attack to destroy 
thousands of lives as well as buildings representing national security of the U.S. (pentagon) 
and economic influence and stability (World Trade Center) resulted in an evolvement of the 
investments into counter terrorism and therefore aviation security (Clarke & Newman, 2006) 
– thus, representing the typical action-response-reaction relationship within the security 
branch (Mitchener-Nissen, Bowers, & Chetty, 2012). Especially in aviation security all new 
amendments were a reaction to intelligence-service knowledge about a planned or actual 
attack (Mitchener-Nissen et al., 2012), and every new amendment forced attackers to change 
their modus operandi (Clarke & Newman, 2006). 
In general, two possible ways to improve security can be distinguished: a) 
technological improvements and b) improvements concerning the so-called “human factors”. 
Mitchener-Nissen et al. (2012) describe impressively how the improvement of aviation 
security technologies happened over the last forty decades. Since the 1970s, planes were 
successfully attacked by means of smuggled weapons and explosives in hand baggage. As a 
response, aviation security introduced metal detectors as well as X-ray screening of hand 
baggage, which then forced the attackers to switch weapons and explosives into checked 
baggage. Thus, law enforcement started to not let passengers with suspicious baggage enter 
the plane. This resulted in a decreasing rate of attacks. The reaction of attackers to this new 
kind of aviation security resulted in the new modus operandi now very well known by the 
public as the horrendous attacks on 9/11, where hijackers turned the plane itself into a 
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gigantic explosive (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). 
Since then, suicide bombings have become one of the greatest threats to aviation security 
(Hofer & Wetter, 2012). Due to the incapability of metal detectors to signal organic material 
and the former allowance of fluids in hand baggage, suicide bombers could transport liquid 
and/or organic explosives on body or in hand baggage, e.g. Richard Reid also known as the 
shoe bomber (Frank, Maccario, & Govindaraju, 2009; Mitchener-Nissen et al., 2012).   
After 9/11 and the prevention of planned attacks as the above mentioned shoe 
bombing, several new kinds of technologies were developed, for example, liquid explosives 
detection systems (LEDS: Hofer & Wetter, 2012) and body scanners (Mock, 2009; Bart, 
2012; Hofer & Wetter, 2012; Mitchener-Nissen et al., 2012). The combination of these two 
technologies should make it impossible for attackers to enter an airplane with organic 
explosives.  
However, the best technology is just as good as the human that operates it. For 
example, it is known that the 9/11 hijackers could enter the planes with knives and box 
cutters, indicating the inadequacy of hand baggage screening at that time (Mitchener-Nissen 
et al., 2012). This example dramatically shows the high importance of human factors in 
security, because the visual inspection of hand baggage to find threat objects using X-ray 
imaging is one of the most important tasks of security personnel at airports (Hardmeier, 
Hofer, & Schwaninger, 2005). It is important that the operating humans are selected and 
trained to perform their task efficiently, otherwise the technology is not of much value 
(Schwaninger, 2005).  
In general, object-recognition happens when the perceived visual information matches 
the visual representation stored in memory. The stored representation comes from prior 
exposure to the respective stimuli (Schwaninger, 2005). According to Schwaninger (2005) the 
most important factors influencing the detection performance of a baggage screener are a) the 
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knowledge about prohibited items and b) the knowledge about what they look like in X-ray 
images. Security personnel might have rather good knowledge about which items are 
prohibited and they might also have a solid representation of how these items look in real life. 
But as baggage screeners at an airport, they have to be able to recognize these items in an X-
ray image and in a fully packed baggage. As a consequence, they must be able to detect such 
items at different positions in different orientations and (usually) overlapped by other objects 
(Schwaninger, Hardmeier, & Hofer, 2004). Back to the example of the 9/11 hijackers, if 
screeners have never seen what a box cutter looks like in an X-ray image, they will not be 
able to detect it as a prohibited item. Or if they have never seen a knife from the backside, 
chances are high that they will not be able to identify it as a threat. It was therefore important 
for an increase of aviation security to develop a test and training tool which allowed to select 
and train security baggage screener in detecting threat items in hand baggage (Schwaninger & 
Hofer, 2004; Hardmeier et al., 2005; Schwaninger, 2005). According to Schwaninger (2005), 
the “X-Ray Tutor”, a training tool for baggage screener, encountered many different airports 
all over Europe and U.S. since 2002. 
Despite the fact that such selection and training tools show promising improvements, 
they too have to be updated continuously as reaction to new threats. When British law 
enforcement arrested several people on August 9, 2006, they found strong indications for the 
plan to blow up several aircrafts by means of liquid explosives (Schwaninger, 2006). 
Consequently, liquids were prohibited in hand baggage and baggage screeners needed to be 
trained in detecting liquids in X-ray images. 
LEDS, body scanners, X-ray imaging for hand baggage, improving all these 
technologies is important but the use of all these parts reduces passenger flow at an airport 
remarkably (Hofer & Wetter, 2012). Thus, how much more convenient would it be to catch 
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possible criminals and terrorists during the build-up phase of their act with only human 
observers with as less influence on passenger flow as possible?  
1.1.1 Behavior detection and its role in security  
The idea of early-on identification of criminal/terroristic intentions was implemented 
in the development of so-called behavior detection programs (BD programs) which are based 
on the reasoning that it should be possible to infer criminal intentions based on nonverbal 
behavior (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010). Israel (Behavior Pattern Detection) 
and the U.S. (SPOT: Screening Passengers by Observation Technique) were the pioneering 
countries concerning such behavior detection programs (Frank et al., 2009; U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2010). Meanwhile several European countries implemented similar 
programs, e.g. U.K.’s Griffin Project (City of London Police, 2014). As an example, SPOT 
trained officers observe the passengers based on a checklist consisting of mostly nonverbal 
behavioral cues. According to U.S. Government Accountability Office (2010) each of these 
nonverbal behavioral cues has an according amount of points. As soon as the behavior of 
passengers exceeds baseline behavior (behavior that is typically expected in such a situation) 
observers must mentally add up the according points of the observed behaviors. If the 
summed up points reach a certain threshold, the officer hands the passenger over to the police 
for further investigation (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010). The importance of 
such programs – if effective – is quite obvious; they could also be implemented in daily work 
of law enforcement not only in counter terrorism.  
The implementation of behavior detection programs all over the world indicates the 
high expectations and beliefs towards inferring other’s intentions from nonverbal behavior. 
Already 40 years ago, many journalists started to write popular books on nonverbal 
communication which mostly over-interpreted what actually could be concluded from 
research (Koivumaki, 1975; Masip, 2005). Probably the most famous research finding often 
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mistakenly described in such popular books is the so-called mehrabian formula, based on the 
studies of Mehrabian and Wiener (1966) and Mehrabian and Ferris (1967). The formula states 
that only 7% of a message is sent via the actual spoken content and 93% via nonverbal 
channels (e.g. mimics and pitch). Mehrabian and colleagues correctly describe in their studies 
that this formula was based on the communication of positive and negative emotions by using 
only ONE word. In some popular books authors erroneously generalize this finding on whole 
messages and argue that nonverbal behavior as a whole is the most important channel for all 
communication (e.g. Kuhnke, 2008). In order to interpret nonverbal behavior, authors propose 
rather bogus statements (Hecht & Ambady, 1999), such as “crossing the legs or arms clearly 
signifies that the person is not psychologically “open” to the other” (Masip, 2005, p. 79). 
These untested beliefs of the authors of such books had enormous influence on interested but 
unfamiliar readers, consequently leading them to wrongly attributing personality traits to 
people, for example in a job interview. In extreme cases this might even result in wrongly 
reject a person (Masip, 2005). 
Research on nonverbal communication mostly contradicts the public’s beliefs, 
nevertheless, it seems as if these stereotypes had more value outside of the scientific 
community due to the more popularity of such “self-help” books (Masip, 2005). As Masip 
(2005) points out, this is even more relevant considering the detection of lies based on 
nonverbal behavior. If a suspect was interrogated about a murder and the interrogator relied 
on nonverbal behavioral cues to deception proposed in such books, the life of the suspect 
could be at stake in case the interrogator’s statement about the credibility of the suspect is 
taken as evidence in a court trial (Masip, 2005; Vrij, 2008). Inbau, Reid, Buckley, and Jayne 
(2001), for example, published a training program designed for security personnel who had to 
interrogate suspects and witnesses. As a part of this program deception cues are taught (Vrij, 
2008). Kassin and Fong (1999) showed empirically that people, trained by means of the Inbau 
et al. (2001) cues to deception, performed worse after the training and were biased towards 
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identifying lies. Moreover, they were even more confident of their statements. These results 
do not surprise if research about cues to deception is considered, as the cues trained could not 
be confirmed by empirical research on deception (Masip, 2005). As a consequence, this 
training does not only influence the performance in lie detection, it also decreases 
performance in judging truth statements (Mann, Vrij, & Bull, 2004). According to Masip 
(2005), more than 300,000 professionals have been trained with Inbau’s et al. (2001) training. 
This example dramatically demonstrates the danger of such programs if they are not 
scientifically examined carefully. Despite that the Inbau training focuses on interrogation 
settings, similar false beliefs presumably also exist for the expressed nonverbal behavior due 
to an underlying hidden criminal intention. Therefore, for a behavior detection program as 
SPOT to be effective, three conditions must be met: First, offenders’ hidden criminal 
intentions must be displayed in nonverbal behavior that triggers suspiciousness. Second, 
observers must be able to infer hidden criminal intentions based on nonverbal behavioral 
cues, and, third, the detection of hidden criminal intentions during the build-up phase must be 
teachable and trainable.  
Before any of these conditions can be accepted, one general underlying presumption 
must be met, namely that our intentions are expressed in nonverbal behavior at all. 
Considering our daily life it is reasonable to assume that we express intentions via the 
nonverbal channel, and that we are able to infer other’s intentions based on nonverbal 
behavior. For example, if we saw somebody running towards a waiting train waving his/her 
hands we would almost immediately interpret the running behavior as the expressed intention 
of reaching this train and the waving as asking us to keep the door from closing. Thus, some 
of our intentions are indeed expressed in nonverbal behavior and at least if the behavior is 
shown deliberately (e.g. running and waving) we are able to infer the underlying intention 
correctly (see Baldwin & Baird, 2001, for review).  
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1.1.2 Hidden intentions expressed in nonverbal behavior 
Already Darwin (1872/1998) postulated that besides emotions mimics might also 
express thoughts or intentions. Regarding the expression of emotions in mimics he even 
proposed that these were universal. If all people would express emotions differently there 
would be no possibility to define cues to hidden criminal intentions during the build-up phase, 
because every offender would express things completely different. Emotional expressions 
being universal, seems to be rather trivial today, but at the time Darwin sketched his ideas it 
was not as he used it to support his evolution theory.  
Ekman and Friesen (1969b) and Ekman et al. (1987) showed scientifically that at least 
facial expressions of basic emotions (e.g. fear, happiness) are indeed universal. However, 
Ekman (1998) also showed that Japanese students masked their felt emotions by smiling 
more, because in their culture showing negative emotions was not approved. Thus, culture 
and society codetermine the rules that manage facial expressions. This so-called display rules 
indicate that people might be able to control their behavior to some extent (Ekman, 1998). 
More important, people really try to control their behavior under certain circumstances (J. K. 
Burgoon & Buller, 1994), and they probably try so especially if they want to hide what they 
intend to do. Imagine a terrorist entering an airport having the intention to blow up a plane by 
suicide bombing. This terrorist will try to deceive security personnel, other passengers, or the 
flight crew. In other words, this terrorist will try to hide the intention and behave as 
inconspicuously as possible. 
Ekman (2009) proposed that guilt, fear and delight were the emotions that underlie lies 
or deception. Although, these results come from lie detection research and are based mostly 
on interrogation settings, one could assume that similar emotions underlie a hidden criminal 
intention during the build-up phase. Therefore, concerning the imagined terrorist from above, 
on the one hand he/she could feel guilty for intending to destroy as many lives to achieve 
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his/her higher goal. On the other hand, he/she could be scared of being detected and not 
achieve the higher goal. At some point during the build-up phase, maybe shortly before 
entering the plane, he/she might also be delighted by almost having achieved the goal. Thus, 
the combination of a stressful situation, trying to appear truthful, and control of the own 
behavior might result in informative cues making observers able to detect the deception. 
However, several studies examining lie detection abilities showed rather modest 
detection rates independent of the “expertise” of the observers (DePaulo & Pfeifer, 1986; Vrij 
& Graham, 1997; Meissner & Kassin, 2002; Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & Vrij, 2004; 
Bond & DePaulo, 2006; see Vrij, 2008 for review). Thus, neither do we seem to be very good 
at detecting lies based on nonverbal behavior at all, nor does professional experience with 
interrogations (e.g. as a police officer) help to improve detection rate. These results are rather 
discouraging concerning the second and third condition for the effectiveness of a behavior 
detection program as they refer to the detection ability and trainability of detection.   
It is important to notice, though, that the existing literature about cues to deception and 
lie detection ability focuses on interrogation settings (see Sporer & Schwandt, 2007; Vrij, 
2008 for reviews), which is different to the build-up phase of a criminal act in many ways. 
Firstly, the interrogation setting that is researched in most studies does not have a build-up 
phase, because as soon as the interrogation starts the intention to hide the truth is already 
expressed. In other words, the actual build-up phase would be the waiting time until the 
interrogation starts. Lie detection, therefore, is more similar to the detection of the committed 
criminal act. In contrast, thieves or terrorists intend to steal or blow-up something and must be 
detected before they express the intentions. Second, the term interrogation already implies 
that the observed suspect directly and overtly interacts with the interviewer and therefore tries 
to convince somebody. This is in contrast to the criminals during the build-up phase, because 
they do not interact with security personnel and do not try to convince somebody in the same 
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way as a lying suspect during interrogation. Third, also truth-tellers try to convince the 
interrogator and therefore might alter their nonverbal behavior (Strömwall, Hartwig, & 
Granhag, 2006; Sporer & Schwandt, 2007). If truth-tellers as well as liars alter their nonverbal 
behavior during an interrogation and the interviewer does not know who is telling the truth, 
he/she never has a solid and real guideline for nonverbal behavior expressed when telling the 
truth. In other words, interviewers in interrogation settings never have a reliable guideline to 
compare suspects’ behavior to. In contrast, offenders hiding their criminal intention during a 
build-up phase of a criminal act might try to become one with the crowd and therefore alter 
their behavior. However, bystanders in this situation mostly just go their regular way without 
having the need to persuade somebody of something. Consequently, bystanders might be a 
perfect guideline for observers to compare the behavior of possible suspect to. Thus, it might 
be easier to detect criminal intentions during the build-up phase than detecting a lie during an 
interrogation. Some evidence for this assumption comes from a study of Troscianko et al. 
(2004): They showed that at least the prediction of aggressive, unlawful acts based on 
nonverbal behavior is possible, although they found no difference in performance between 
laypeople and CCTV operators and the results could not be replicated (Grant & Williams, 
2011). Still, some preliminary studies with rather small sample sizes and/or methodological 
issues showed promising results regarding the ability to detect the hidden criminal intention 
based on nonverbal behavior during the build-up phase (Heubrock, Kindermann, Palkies, & 
Röhrs, 2009a; Baettig, Frey, & Hofer, 2011; Heubrock, 2011). Despite these few preliminary 
studies, though, there is still need to examine the hidden criminal intention detection during 
the build-up phase in better controlled studies with larger sample sizes. 
Another problem that has been prevalent in previous studies – with the exception of 
the study of Eachus, Stedmon, and Baillie (2013) – concerns the fact that always the behavior 
of different people as offenders and non-offenders was compared. This is problematic because 
the nonverbal behavior of a generally calm person in the control situation could be compared 
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to the nonverbal behavior of a generally nervous person in the crime situation or vice versa. 
This would result in an overestimation of possible cues to hidden criminal intentions or an 
underestimation, respectively. 
Based on the lack of sound scientific evidence on the topic of detecting hidden 
criminal intentions during the build-up phase of a criminal act, developers of behavior 
detection programs might rely either on the ambiguous literature from self-help books about 
lie detection or/and serious literature on lie detection. Thus, when examining the build-up 
phase, the results from lie detection research have to be taken into account. Additionally, the 
underlying emotions and the attempted behavioral control might still be the same for liars in 
interrogations and criminals during the build-up phase. In the end, this might result in similar 
behaviors but before accepting this conclusion, additional evidence is required.  
Therefore, the main goal of this thesis was to contribute scientific evidence towards 
the effectiveness of behavior detection programs, such as SPOT, by examining the three 
mentioned conditions underlying the successful detection of deceptive offenders during the 
build-up of their criminal act.  
1.2 Empirical studies 
In the first study reported in this thesis (“Who’s the thief?” The influence of 
knowledge and experience on early detection of criminal intentions), we examined whether 
offenders (in our case thieves) who hide their intention can be identified out of a rather large 
crowd of bystanders during the build-up phase of the theft. In other words, examine the 
second condition for the effectiveness of BD programs: observers must be able to infer hidden 
criminal intentions based on nonverbal behavioral cues. Additionally, we were interested in 
the influence of theoretical knowledge received during the first education as a police officer 
and of work experience as a police officer. Thus, examine the third condition for the 
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effectiveness of BD programs: the detection of hidden criminal intentions during build-up 
must be teachable and trainable. For this purpose, we examined five groups of participants 
(students of psychology, police recruits, inexperienced police officers, experienced police 
officers, and criminal investigators) by means of a specially developed computer-based test 
containing twelve authentic CCTV recordings of real baggage thefts at a large international 
airport. Students of psychology and police recruits represented laypeople, while inexperienced 
police officers were included to reveal the influence of theoretical knowledge. Experienced 
police officers and criminal investigators represented the influence of work experience per se 
and specific work experience in observing people, respectively. The participants were asked 
to identify thieves at three points during the build-up phase by a mouse click on the suspect(s) 
head(s). Data were analyzed according to Signal Detection Theory (Green & Swets, 1974). To 
foreshadow the main results, all groups of participants were able to identify thieves correctly 
shortly before the criminal act was actually committed. However, inexperienced police 
officers outperformed laypeople impressively already at the beginning of the build-up phase, 
thus pointing to the relevance of theoretical knowledge about offenders’ modi operandi and 
the role of the context. Criminal investigators who were more specialized in observing people 
outperformed inexperienced police officers at every decision point during the build-up phase. 
Experienced police officers with no special experience in observing people, but on average 
having the same amount of work experience as a police officer as the criminal investigators, 
performed somewhere in between inexperienced police officers and criminal investigators. 
These latter results clearly point to the (additional) relevance of practical experience, and this 
practical experience helps the more the closer it is related to the actual task to be performed. 
Based on the evidence from the first study that deceptive offenders, such as thieves, 
can indeed be detected during the build-up phase, we examined in the second study (What is 
suspicious when trying to be inconspicuous? Criminal intentions inferred from nonverbal 
behavioral cues) what possible nonverbal behavioral cues to hidden criminal intentions exist. 
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In other words, examine the first condition for the effectiveness of BD programs: offenders’ 
hidden criminal intentions must be displayed in nonverbal behavior that triggers 
suspiciousness. In this study, we focused on a specific subset of visually recognizable 
nonverbal behavior: spatial moving patterns (e.g. how the person moves in a public space: 
Heubrock, 2011), communication behavior (e.g. hand signs: based on personal 
communication with police officers), self-adaptors (e.g. scratching or scrubbing the face with 
one hand: Sporer & Schwandt, 2007), and object-adaptors (e.g. use of an object like a 
cellphone without instrumental goal: Heubrock, Kindermann, Palkies, & Röhrs, 2009b).  
For the purpose of this study, we created our own recordings additionally to the 
authentic CCTV recordings from the first study. These self-made recordings were taken from 
eight different mock offenders or teams of mock offenders. Each of the offenders first had to 
search a non-existing person. This task resulted in a goal-driven noncriminal intention and 
additionally in the possibility to later exclude mere search behavior from the build-up phase 
of a criminal act. After this task, they had to either try to steal something or place a mock 
bomb to “murder” as many people as possible. These tasks were recorded by a static camera 
filming the whole situation without ever zoom or move (space condition) and several cameras 
zooming into the actors (zoom condition).  
Based on these recordings we conducted two experiments. In the first experiment we 
addressed moving patterns in space (e.g. abrupt changes in direction or speed) and 
communication behavior (e.g. hand signs, head movements) as the behaviors of interest. To 
validate our recordings ecologically, we used some of the authentic CCTV recordings from 
the first study. For the first experiment, we only used the space condition. In the second 
experiment, we were interested in the difference between the behavior of a person in an 
offender and a non-offender situation concerning self- and object-adaptors. To examine these 
behaviors, we used the zoom condition.  
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The results of this study indicate that offenders indeed show a different nonverbal 
behavior concerning these behaviors of interest. In the first experiment, offenders showed a 
different moving pattern than non-offenders: (1) Offenders in the authentic CCTV recordings 
and in the mock crime recordings were rated similar concerning moving patterns, (2) all 
offenders and non-offenders were rated to show moving patterns that deviate from moving 
patterns of the bystanders’ crowd, (3) the strongest deviation from the bystanders’ crowd was 
reached in the control search situation. Communication behaviors were not expressed 
differently in all three conditions (search, mock crime and real crime), but in all three 
conditions observed people’s use of communication behavior deviated from the use of the 
bystanders’ crowd. In the second experiment, offenders expressed more object-adaptors and 
less self-adaptors during the build-up phase of the mock criminal act compared to the search 
of a non-existing person. 
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Abstract 
The present study investigates if people are able to recognize thieves based on their 
nonverbal behavior prior to committing the crime. To this end, we implemented authentic 
CCTV footage from thefts committed at an international airport into a computer-based test. 
Five groups of participants (students, police recruits, inexperienced police officers, 
experienced police officers, criminal investigators) were studied. The results show that 
laypeople already performed above chance in the early recognition of thieves. However, they 
were outperformed by inexperienced police officers, who had just finished their basic 
training. Criminal investigators performed best. It follows that criminals display nonverbal 
behavior that can be used by observers for early recognition of criminal intentions. In 
addition, early recognition seems to benefit from knowledge about the criminals’ modi 
operandi, which renders early recognition teachable and trainable. Further, all participants 
were biased towards innocence in their response tendency, but this bias was less pronounced 
in police officers than in students. These findings are discussed in relation to the in lie 
detection research well documented truth-bias and investigator-bias.  
 
 
 
 
Keywords:  
Behavior detection; early recognition of criminal intentions; interpretation of 
nonverbal behavior; truth-bias; investigator-bias  
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2.1  Introduction 
The prevention of criminal activities is one of the core tasks of law enforcement in 
order to ensure public security. Preventative measures can involve the public, for example 
through information campaigns and educational work, or they can be carried out by 
authorities themselves, as in prevention and counteraction of criminal activities by early 
recognition of offenders. The earlier law enforcement personnel can detect criminal intentions 
on patrol or during an investigation, the more time for reaction and intervention remains, thus 
potentially increasing the chances of success. For example, if law enforcement personnel can 
identify thieves before the actual theft is committed, they can observe the action more clearly, 
record evidence while catching the thieves in the act, and ensure that the stolen goods do not 
disappear but can be handed back to the victims. 
In the context of terrorist attacks, which have evolved into one of the biggest threats to 
society during the last decades, the prevention of criminal activities appears to be even more 
important. In that case, the observation and analysis of passenger behavior is a security 
measure that is becoming increasingly popular at airports in order to facilitate an early 
detection of signs of criminal intentions. In practice, several countries including pioneers like 
Israel and the U.S., as well as an increasing number of European countries, implemented 
programs that aim at improving early detection of signs of criminal intentions (Frank et al., 
2009; U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010). Although these programs are based on 
different concepts and work with different methods, they all train security personnel in the 
analysis of people’s behavior for signs of criminal intentions, primarily to detect terroristic 
intentions. For example, the U.S.’ program SPOT (Screening Passengers by Observation 
Technique) teaches a checklist of suspicious behaviors (especially nonverbal ones), which is 
then used by behavior detection officers for screening people and situations. Depending on 
the kind and the intensity of the observed behavior, law enforcement officers will take over 
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and conduct further investigation of the person in question (U.S. Government Accountability 
Office, 2010). At least three conditions must be met so that such prevention programs at 
airports or in general policing can be effective: First, offenders must display significant 
behaviors that relate to their intentions, and that can thus arouse suspicion in observers. 
Second, observers must have the ability to infer criminal intentions based on other people’s 
(mostly nonverbal) behavior. Third, as it can be assumed that not everybody is already 
proficient by nature, the detection of criminal intentions through the analysis of the offenders’ 
behavior must be teachable and trainable. 
The correct interpretation of other people’s behavior is an important ability for daily 
human life (Asch, 1946; Johansson, 1973; or Baldwin & Baird, 2001, for review). For 
instance, if a car driver decelerates and waves a hand at a pedestrian who wants to cross a 
road without traffic lights, the pedestrian can conclude from the driver’s behavior that the 
driver intends to stop and give way. Without being able to infer other people’s intentions 
based on their behavior, such nonverbal communication would not be possible. Thus, at least 
if nonverbal signs are used which deliberately aim at communicating intentions, we seem to 
be able to infer other people’s intentions. Apart from such obvious nonverbal cues, other 
physical signs can serve as cues for inferring hypotheses about internal processes of others as 
well (Gray, 1988; J. Burgoon et al., 2005; Vrij, 2008; Eachus et al., 2013). For instance, 
trembling or perspiration can be read as signs for an increased stress level. Therefore, such 
physical signs can also provide information about others even though the counterpart does not 
consciously intend to provide this information (e.g., Zuckerman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 
1981). 
Such signs often appear as a byproduct of the physical reaction to a stressor. Imagine a 
thief being interrogated by the police. Whereas the primary intention in such a situation may 
be to deceive the interrogator, the interrogated person tries to hide this intention, for example 
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by trying to behave as naturally as possible (Ekman, Friesen, & O’Sullivan, 1988). The fear of 
this primary intention being discovered by the interrogator can lead to increased stress 
symptoms that cannot be (fully) controlled deliberately, since they are an autonomous 
reaction of the vegetative nervous system (Greene et al., 1985; Andreassi, 1995). Therefore, 
under such stressful circumstances it might be more difficult to control nonverbal behavior 
than verbal behavior (DePaulo, 1992; Ekman, 1993). For example, so-called micro-
expressions (i.e., muscle action in the face due to strongly felt emotions) are such an 
involuntary sign which may reveal valuable information about deception (Ekman & Friesen, 
1969a; Ekman, 2009). Hence, the interrogator might be able to read these physical 
(nonverbal) signs as hints that the person may actually be lying. Ultimately, the intention of 
deception may be revealed. 
Several studies examined whether performance in the detection of lies is better than 
chance and, in particular, whether different groups of people with different amounts of 
expertise (e.g., laypeople, police officers, or expert interviewers) differ in performance (see 
Vrij, 2008, for review). This research revealed that the performance even of the most 
professional lie catchers is modest (DePaulo & Pfeifer, 1986; Vrij & Graham, 1997; Meissner 
& Kassin, 2002; Hartwig et al., 2004; Bond & DePaulo, 2006), suggesting that the human 
ability to detect deception in an interrogation setting is generally rather poor. Kassin, 
Meissner, and Norwick (2005) showed that lie detection performance is slightly better if 
observers have access to the audio channel only, thus suggesting that nonverbal behavior or 
physical signs might even distract from the correct interpretation. In sum, the current 
scientific literature on detection of lies neither consistently supports the assumption that 
nonverbal behavior or physical signs represent reliable sources of information for detecting 
criminal intentions, nor that professional experience leads to improvements in doing so.  
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In contrast to those seemingly discouraging results, Troscianko et al. (2004) found that 
people nevertheless seem to be able to predict aggressive behavior based on nonverbal cues, 
at least for antisocial unlawful acts like assaults or vandalism: They found that CCTV-
operators as well as laypeople are able to predict antisocial or criminal, aggressive behavior in 
CCTV recordings. Contrary to situations that are used as examples in teaching the detection 
of lies, and contrary to situations in which an offender tries to act as inconspicuously as 
possible, the offenders in this study did not try to hide their intentions. Therefore, the task was 
not to detect a hidden criminal intention, but rather an intention of aggressive or antisocial 
behavior. From an evolutionary perspective, recognizing aggressive behavior as early as 
possible is important for one’s own survival. This may explain why laypeople are as good as 
CCTV-operators in that particular task. Grant and Williams (2011) could not replicate these 
findings: Their participants only performed at chance level. Nevertheless, the idea survives 
that in some situations people indeed are able to predict unlawful, aggressive acts based on 
nonverbal behavior. 
Much like liars in interrogation settings, smugglers (Vrij, 2008), thieves, and most 
terrorists try to hide their criminal intention as long as possible, i.e., they try to deceive. 
However, lie detection differs from detection of deception prior to committing a criminal act 
in one main aspect: The typical build-up phase that culminates in a criminal act as for 
example a theft, during which the offender tries to act as naturally as possible, is missing in 
situations like interrogations. Furthermore, research showed that during interrogations, both 
liars and truth-tellers alter their behavior strategically: liars do so in order to appear truthful, 
whereas truth-tellers do so in order to make sure the interrogator does not mistake them for 
liars (DePaulo et al., 2003; Strömwall et al., 2006). Regardless of their experience, it may 
therefore be difficult for interrogators to distinguish these two cases. In contrast, the task of 
distinguishing individuals with criminal intentions from innocent bystanders in a public space 
does not contain this problem. Thus, both the offender’s as well as the observer’s “task” differ 
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between lie detection and the detection of criminal intention prior to committing a criminal 
act. 
The build-up phase prior to a criminal act can be illustrated by the example of Richard 
Reid, who attempted to detonate a bomb inside the cabin during a flight in December 2001 
(Younge & Campbell, 2003; Frank et al., 2009). Reid had to enter the airport, pass the 
security screening, and enter the plane without being detected. His criminal intentions must 
have been present days before already. Thus, he had to hide his intentions for a long time. He 
presumably tried to act as naturally as possible in order not to be detected by the security 
personnel. In a similar way, criminals (e.g., thieves or drug dealers) have to hide their 
intentions as long as possible in order to be “successful.” Thus, we accept the premise that 
smugglers, thieves, and most terrorists try to act as inconspicuously as possible before 
committing the crime, which may cause them to display similar nonverbal behavioral 
patterns.  
There is only very little research examining the detection of deceptive offenders during 
the build-up phase. A small field study showed that a professional bodyguard indeed could 
detect mock terrorists based on their nonverbal behavior while they tried to hide their 
intention of attacking a public person (Heubrock et al., 2009a). Using CCTV footage of real 
thefts at a large international airport, we are the first ones to investigate 1) whether it is 
possible to detect real hidden criminal intentions during the build-up phase, as well as 2) the 
influence of different levels of professional expertise on detection performance. 
Research in radiology (Nodine et al., 1999) showed an effect of expertise on the 
detection of cancerous tissue. In a similar way, studies in airport security screening found 
effects of training and expertise on the detection of threats inside passenger bags (McCarley, 
Kramer, Wickens, Vidoni, & Boot, 2004; Schwaninger & Hofer, 2004; Hardmeier, Hofer, & 
Schwaninger, 2006; Schwaninger, Hofer, & Wetter, 2007). These visual search tasks can be 
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seen as similar to the search for suspicious people in video footage because these tasks rely on 
the same basic cognitive mechanism: In order to be able to successfully perform these tasks, 
observers have to know exactly what they are looking for, i.e., they have to have a mental 
representation of the search target in visual memory. In the case of detecting criminal 
intentions prior to a criminal act, such a search target might be a particular nonverbal 
behavioral sign or a cluster of such signs (Frank et al., 2009). Thus, people with experience in 
that domain might perform better simply because they know what to look for. Nevertheless, 
neither Troscianko et al. (2004) nor Grant and Williams (2011) found a difference in detection 
performance between CCTV-operators and laypeople in the detection of antisocial or 
aggressive behavior. However, it might be the case that CCTV-operators do not have the 
same degree of systematic training in their specific task as compared to radiologists or X-ray 
screeners who are highly trained within their domain. 
Much like radiologists or X-ray screeners, police officers (POs) gain very detailed 
knowledge about criminal activities during their theoretical training and with professional 
experience. They learn which modi operandi offenders use and which suspicious signs they 
display. Generally speaking, we expect POs to perform better than laypeople in detecting 
thieves before they commit the crime. We expect this effect, which is due to increased 
specific knowledge about crimes, to already be present for POs who have finished their basic 
training, but not for recruits who only just begin police training (Hypothesis 1). 
Research on expertise by Ericsson and Lehmann (1996) and Ericsson (2008) 
emphasizes the importance of extensive daily experience and hard work in order to reach high 
levels of performance in that domain. Police work is very diverse in nature. Criminal 
investigators have the highest degree of specialization in and in-depth daily experience with 
detecting criminal behavior. Therefore, we expect criminal investigators to outperform other 
POs as well as laypeople in detecting thieves before they commit the crime (Hypothesis 2). 
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An effect of work expertise on the prediction of aggressive criminal behavior has 
neither been found by Troscianko et al. (2004), nor by Grant and Williams (2011). Besides 
the above mentioned possible lack of enough systematic training of CCTV-operators in 
detecting criminal intentions, maybe these studies could not reveal an effect of expertise 
simply because expertise was measured with detection performance at the very end of the 
video footage. It may well be the case that expertise manifests itself in early detection, 
probably even during the build-up phase. We expect that POs detect criminal intentions 
earlier than laypeople (Hypothesis 3). 
Research on lie detection has identified two biases: the truth-bias (e.g., McCornack & 
Parks, 1986) and the investigator-bias (e.g., Meissner & Kassin, 2002). People’s responses 
tend to be biased towards judging messages more often as truths than lies, revealing the so-
called truth-bias (Anderson, Ansfield, & DePaulo, 1999). Anderson et al. (1999) argue that 
the truth-bias might be the result of everyday life experience, where people are not often 
confronted with lies. Meissner and Kassin (2002) have revealed the investigator bias: POs are 
biased more towards deception than laypeople. In other words, POs have the tendency to 
judge messages as lies more often than laypeople. It may be assumed that POs’ general 
suspicion might be raised more easily compared to laypeople because they encounter 
deception on a daily basis. The truth-bias and the investigator-bias raise the question of who is 
actually biased: is it the general population, the POs, or everybody? Our study aims at 
reconciling these views by studying the response tendencies of both groups in the domain of 
detecting hidden criminal intentions and using the same task for laypeople and POs. For the 
moment, we expect that POs are more suspicious than laypeople (Hypothesis 4). 
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2.2  Method 
2.2.1  Participants 
A total of N = 315 participants were tested. They belonged to five different groups 
regarding their knowledge and experience with crime. Below, the five different groups and 
their characteristics are explained. Detailed information on age and gender for each group is 
given in Table 1. All participants received immediate feedback about their results at the end 
of the test. They were informed of the possibility to withdraw their consent at any time. 
Table 1  
Experience, age, and gender for the five groups of participants. 
Group Experience in police work in 
years (mean, min-max) 
Age in years 
(mean, min-max) 
Gender 
(male; female) 
Students of psychology ( n= 50) none 24.72 (20-36) 25; 25 
    
Police recruits (n = 40) none 25.48 (20-34) 31; 9 
    
Inexperienced POs (n = 129) 0.45 (0.16-0.75) 26.10 (21-37) 90; 39 
    
Experienced POs (n = 51)  13.91 (4-32) 38.80 (25-56) 46; 5 
    
Criminal investigators (n = 45) 14.22 (4-31) 38.62 (28-54) 41; 4 
    
Fifty students of psychology served as a first group of laypeople. In order to exclude 
possible gender effects, we fully balanced the gender ratio in this group. They were either 
paid according to the usual conditions at the University of Zurich (i.e., CHF 15 per hour) or 
received course credit. As a second group of laypeople, we tested 40 police recruits who had 
just started their basic police training. These two groups did not differ regarding their 
experience or knowledge about criminals and their modi operandi. However, it can be 
expected that the police recruits are highly motivated for this task. Comparisons between 
these two groups of laypeople will thus later allow us to discover potential motivational 
effects as well as self-selection effects, meaning that people might join law enforcement, 
because they believe that they are really good at detecting criminals. 
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Next, we included professional POs of different stages in their career in our quasi-
experimental design: We examined 129 inexperienced POs who had just finished the first year 
of their training, which consists of basic theoretical training and a few months of practical 
experience only, 51 POs who never worked as criminal investigators but who are considered 
as generally experienced, as well as 45 criminal investigators. This last group consisted of 
people who were all active criminal investigators in the respective branch of Zurich State 
Police at the time the study was conducted, or people who had worked there before during 
their career. All POs took the test during their paid working hours.  
2.2.2  Materials 
A computer-based test was developed that employs authentic CCTV footage showing 
baggage thieves shortly before they commit the crime. We decided to use authentic CCTV 
footage of thefts for three reasons: First, it is hypothesized that thieves try to hide their 
intentions as long as possible in order to avoid being detected by bystanders or the victims 
themselves. Second, as POs participated in the study, we wanted to make sure that the used 
video footage shows crimes they are familiar with. As thefts occur frequently, most POs 
encounter them during their career. Third, it is important to test detection performance with 
real crimes because it is not yet clear whether mock criminals show similar behavior to real 
criminals. 
Twelve CCTV recordings from a large international airport were used as stimuli. Each 
recording contained a real theft committed by one to three baggage thieves in either the 
check-in or the shopping area. In all recordings together, there were 23 different thieves. The 
recordings were selected based on the following criteria: 
a) The build-up phase of the theft lasts at least 50 s. 
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b) Three or more possible distractors are present. This means that there are three or 
more other people, who remain visible for a similar amount of time as the thieves. They act a 
little different from the surrounding crowd (e.g., standing still while all other people are 
moving). 
The first author and two POs from the criminal investigation branch of Zurich State 
Police, who did not take part in the study, selected the video footage used in this study. Each 
recording contained between twenty and over a hundred people in total. As the recordings 
were shown to the participants in original CCTV quality, no faces could be identified. 
The twelve recordings lasted from 53 s to 144 s with an average of 104 s. Each 
recording was cut into three sequences. The third sequence stopped just before the first 
movement of the offender(s) towards the stolen goods or towards the victim. The decision 
about where to cut the first and the second sequence was again taken by the first author 
together with two experienced criminal investigators. This decision depended on the thieves’ 
actions as there had to be at least some minimum action (e.g., body movement) present within 
the first sequence. Furthermore, we tried to keep the duration of the three sequences as similar 
as possible across all recordings: Sequence 1 lasted from 10 s to 52 s (M = 29 s), sequence 2 
lasted from 10 s to 80 s (M = 37s), and sequence 3 lasted from 11 s to 90 s (M = 37 s). 
2.2.3  Procedure 
All POs were tested at the beginning of a two-day training course on the detection of 
suspicious behavior. Groups of 35 to 39 participants took the test together in a room with 
desktop computers. All participants received basic information on the relevance of the topic 
for security in general, as well as some basic information on our study. Exactly the same 
information was given to the two laypeople groups, who were tested in groups of one to five 
(students of psychology) and 40 people (police recruits), respectively.  
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The computer-based test first displayed an instructional text followed by an example 
recording including a theft. Participants were informed about the existence of one to three 
thieves in each movie, but they did not know the exact number of thieves in each of the three 
sequences. After the example movie, participants had the possibility to ask questions or to 
continue directly by pressing the space bar. The twelve recordings were presented in random 
order. Each sequence ended with a still frame. At this point the participants had to mark the 
suspected person(s) by clicking the mouse on the head(s) of the suspect(s). By pressing the 
space bar, participants started the next sequence. If participants decided that no offender was 
visible in a sequence, they omitted the mouse click and just pressed the space bar to start the 
next sequence. After each sequence and after each answer, participants were allowed to take a 
short break if they wanted to. At the end of the test, participants received feedback on the 
number of correctly identified thieves per sequence.  
2.3  Results 
In our analyses, we employed measures from Signal Detection Theory (Green & 
Swets, 1974), which can be seen as a standard in research on detection performance. Based on 
this theory, there are four possible combinations of a participant’s answer and stimulus 
presence: In our case, a correctly identified thief is defined as a hit, a non-thief that did not 
arouse suspicion is defined as a correct rejection, a wrongly suspected person is defined as a 
false alarm, and a missed thief is defined as a miss. For methodological reasons, the number 
of total clicks within each sequence was limited to three, i.e., in each sequence, a maximum of 
three false alarms and of one to three hits was possible. As a consequence, 108 false alarms 
were possible overall. Participants could score 20 hits in the first sequences of all recordings, 
22 hits in the second sequences, and 23 hits in the third sequences. As a consequence, 65 hits 
were possible overall. The measures d’ and C were used to analyze detection performance and 
response tendency, respectively. As they are calculated based on percentages of hits and false 
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alarms, the different absolute numbers of possible hits and false alarms are accounted for. 
Because sphericity was never given in our data, we corrected the degrees of freedom 
according to Greenhouse-Geisser in all subsequent analyses. In all multiple comparisons, we 
adjusted the p-value according to Bonferroni. 
2.3.1  Hits and false Alarms 
As a first step, we plotted the overall hit rate (pHit) and the overall false alarms rate 
(pFA) for each participant (Figure 1).  
All participants had a rather low pFA, whereas their pHit spread over almost the whole 
possible range. We then compared all five groups in all three sequences with respect to their 
pHit as well as their pFA. In order to do so, we conducted two mixed analyses of variance 
(ANOVA) with group (students of psychology, police recruits, inexperienced POs, 
experienced POs, and criminal investigators) as between-subjects factor and sequence (1, 2, 3) 
as within-subjects factor (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 1. Overall hit and false alarm rates for all five groups. 
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The ANOVA for pHit shows a significant main effect of group with F(4, 310) = 38.21, 
p < .001, η² = .33, and a significant main effect of sequence with F(1.53, 473.13) = 931.40, p 
< .001, η² = .75. There is no significant interaction between group and sequence F(6.11, 
473.13) = 1.39, p = .217, η² = .02, indicating that the increase in pHit with increasing 
sequence is similar for all groups in all sequences. Post hoc pairwise comparisons between the 
five groups are displayed in Table 2. All groups of POs and the police recruits differ 
significantly from the students of psychology in pHit (all PO groups: p < .001, police recruits: 
p = .010). Police recruits differ significantly from all PO groups in pHit (all comparisons at 
least: p < .05). The criminal investigators differ significantly from inexperienced POs in pHit 
(p = .019), but not from experienced POs (p = 1.000). 
 
Table 2 
Pairwise comparisons of pHit between students of psychology, police recruits, inexperienced POs, 
experienced POs, and criminal investigators (N = 315). 
 Police recruits Inexperienced 
POs 
Experienced 
POs 
Criminal 
investigators 
Students of psychology p = .010 p < .001 p < .001 p < 0.001 
     
Police recruits  p < .001 p < .001 p < 0.001 
     
Inexperienced POs   p = 1.00 p = .019 
     
Experienced POs    p = 1.000 
     
 
Figure 2. Mean hit and false alarm rates for all five groups in all three sequences. Error bars represent 
confidence intervals (95%) for between-subjects comparisons.  
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The ANOVA for pFA shows a significant main effect of group with F(4, 310) = 4.88, 
p < .001, η² = .06, and a significant main effect of sequence with F(1.67, 520.04) = 143.94, p 
< .001, η² = .32. Contrary to pHit, pFA decreases over all three sequences as can be seen in 
Figure 2. There is a significant interaction between group and sequence F(6.71, 520.04) = 
2.39, p = .022, η² = .03. The detailed values of post hoc pairwise comparisons between the 
five groups are displayed in Table 3. All groups differ significantly from the police recruits in 
their pFA (experienced POs: p < .05; all other groups: p < .01). 
 
Table 3 
Pairwise comparisons of pFA between students of psychology, police recruits, inexperienced POs, 
experienced POs, and criminal investigators (N = 315).  
 Police recruits Inexperienced 
POs 
Experienced 
POs 
Criminal 
investigators 
Students of psychology p < 0.001 p = 1.000 p = 1.000 p = 1.000 
     
Police recruits  p = .004 p = .021 p < 0.001 
     
Inexperienced POs   p = 1.000 p = 1.000 
     
Experienced POs    p = 1.000 
     
 
2.3.2  Detection performance, d’ 
Based on pHit and pFA, detection performance d’ was calculated (Figure 3). We then 
compared d’ of all five groups in all three sequences with a mixed analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). Group served as between-subjects factor and sequence served as within-subjects 
factor. The results are depicted in Figure 3. We also conducted pairwise comparisons of all 
five groups. 
There is a significant main effect of group with F(4, 310) = 22.10, p < .001, η² = .22, 
and a significant main effect of sequence with F(1.84, 568.75) = 860.74, p < .001, η² = .74. 
Thus, the more of the recording the participants had seen, the more information they could 
gather. Furthermore, the ANOVA shows a significant interaction between sequence and 
group, with F(7.34, 568.75) = 3.40, p = .001, η² = .04, indicating that at least one group 
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benefits more from the additional information provided in higher sequences than other groups. 
Figure 3 shows that laypeople’s detection was at chance level in sequence 1, whereas 
inexperienced POs performed above chance level already. In sequence 2, the laypeople’s 
detection performances increased rather strongly while the other groups’ performance 
increased less. This finding is confirmed by testing detection performance against chance 
level using one-sample t-tests: In sequence 1, students of psychology (t(49) = 0.10, p = .919) 
and police recruits (t(39) = 1.16, p = .252) did not perform above chance level, whereas 
inexperienced POs showed performance above chance level (t(128) = 9.50, p < .001). In 
sequence 2, the performance of the students of psychology (t(49) = 11.82, p < .001) and the 
police recruits (t(39) = 11.64, p < .001) increased above chance level too.  
The pairwise comparisons between the different groups, as given in Table 4, indicate 
no significant difference between students of psychology and police recruits (p = 1.000; two-
tailed). The performance of these two laypeople groups differs significantly from all PO 
groups, though (all comparisons p < .001; one-tailed). Criminal investigators outperformed 
inexperienced POs (p < .05; one-tailed), but not experienced POs (p = .500; one-tailed).  
 
 
Figure 3. Detection performance (d’) of the five groups in the three sequences (means). Error bars represent 
confidence intervals (95%) for between-subjects comparisons. 
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Table 4 
Pairwise comparisons of detection performance d’ between groups (N = 315).  
 Police recruits Inexperienced POs Experienced POs Criminal 
investigators 
Students of psychology p = 1.000 p < .001
 a
 p < .001
 a
 p < .001
 a
 
     
Police recruits  p < .001
 a
 p < .001
 a
 p < .001
 a
 
     
Inexperienced POs    p = .500
 a
 p = .048
 a
 
     
Experienced POs    p = .500
 a
 
     
a
 One-tailed significance based on hypotheses 
 
2.3.3  Response tendency, C 
Data on response tendency C are given in Figure 4. We conducted a mixed ANOVA 
with group (students of psychology, police recruits, inexperienced POs, experienced POs, and 
criminal investigators) as between-subjects factor and sequence (1, 2, 3) as within-subjects 
factor. This analysis shows a highly significant effect of group, F(4, 310) = 1699.22, p < .001, 
η² = .85. There is also a highly significant effect of sequence, F(1.43, 442.49) = 121.23, p < 
.001, η² = .28. Figure 4 reveals that, the higher the sequence number, the more neutral the 
participants’ response tendency. The interaction between sequence and group reaches 
marginal significance with p = .056, which hints at a possible change in response tendency 
over the three sequences for at least one group. 
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Furthermore, Figure 4 reveals that POs and police recruits are closer to a neutral 
criterion than the students of psychology. The pairwise comparisons confirm this difference: 
The response tendency of the students of psychology is significantly more biased towards 
innocence than the response tendency of all other groups (all comparisons p < .001). Still, all 
groups are significantly biased towards innocence. One-sample t-tests for sequence 3, that 
tested the groups’ criteria against zero, all reveal significant results: police recruits, t(39) = 
14.48, p < .001; inexperienced POs, t(128) = 21.53, p < .001; experienced POs, (t(50) = 
17.52, p < .001; criminal investigators, t(44) = 11.57, p < .001. 
2.4  Discussion 
This pioneering study investigates whether criminals, who try to hide their criminal 
intentions, can be detected by the means of behavioral analysis prior to committing the crime. 
We examined the influence of theoretical knowledge and professional expertise of POs on 
detection performance and response tendency in behavioral analysis. To this end, we tested 
POs with different levels of experience, as well as laypeople, by the means of a computer-
based test that featured authentic CCTV footage showing thieves shortly before they 
successfully managed to steal. 
 
Figure 4. Response tendency (C) of the five groups in the three sequences (means). Error bars represent 
confidence intervals (95%) for between-subjects comparisons. 
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The results show that thieves can indeed be detected prior to committing the crime 
based on their behavior. All groups of participants were able to detect the thieves significantly 
above chance level shortly before committing the theft (namely in sequences 2 and 3). 
Contrary to criminals that plan an aggressive assault, thieves attempt to hide their intention by 
trying to act as natural or unsuspicious as possible. Hence, our results extend the results of 
Troscianko et al., (2004) who showed that aggressive criminal intentions can be detected 
based on nonverbal signs: We show that the same is true for deceptive criminal intentions. 
Furthermore, our study shows that it is possible to identify criminal intentions of one or more 
offenders even in a rather large crowd of people. This is not yet possible for technical 
solutions such as automated detection software like Cogito, which can only be used in 
interrogation settings (Arsíc, Schuller, & Rigoll, 2007; Eachus et al., 2013). 
Contrary to previous findings in behavior detection (Troscianko et al., 2004) and lie 
detection (for reviews see Kraut, 1980; Vrij, 2008), we found a significantly higher detection 
performance in groups with more knowledge and experience. Already inexperienced POs 
performed significantly better than students of psychology as well as police recruits. Thus, 
Hypothesis 1 is confirmed. Our results suggest that POs’ theoretical training not only 
improves detection performance in behavior analysis to a remarkable degree, but that it also 
allows them to perform at the same level as experienced POs. This improvement in detection 
performance manifests itself particularly in a very early detection during the build-up phase, 
i.e., in contrast to laypeople, inexperienced POs are able to recognize thieves already 
relatively long before they commit the crime. 
This finding indicates the importance of the point in time when performance is 
measured. In the studies by Troscianko et al. (2004) and Grant and Williams (2011), 
participants answered at the end of the build-up phase only. This could have masked a 
possible difference between CCTV-operators’ and laypeople’s performance. Another possible 
Chapter 2 – “Who’s the thief?“ 
 
45   
 
explanation for the different results in our study concerning expertise might be POs’ specific 
training and knowledge about criminal acts. This degree of specificity and depth is likely not 
to be reached in CCTV-operator training, which may explain why they did not perform better 
than laypeople in the aforementioned studies. This result is of high practical importance 
because it shows that theoretical knowledge, which is acquired during basic police training, 
already significantly improves detection performance. This implies for police practice that 
basic police training indeed provides POs with an advantage in order to allow for early 
intervention at crime scenes. 
Hypothesis 2 was only partially confirmed: Criminal investigators outperformed all 
groups of participants except experienced POs. Thus, experienced POs perform somewhere in 
between inexperienced POs and criminal investigators. Experienced POs have been on the job 
approximately as long as criminal investigators, but, contrary to criminal investigators, were 
not able to outperform inexperienced POs. Thus, work experience in policing seems to be 
important in order to successfully interpret behavior. It remains unclear, though, how specific 
this work experience in policing has to be in order to be helpful in this particular task, because 
police work is very diverse per se. Ericsson (2008) proposed that not only many years of 
practice but also specific types of training and deliberate efforts are needed in order to reach 
an outstanding performance. 
In our study, the criminal investigators represent the group which is most specialized 
in interpreting behavior during the build-up phase since this is a main task of their daily work. 
Their pattern of pHit and pFA (Figure 1) is rather homogeneous and located in the top half of 
the hit rate scale. The pattern of the experienced POs appears more scattered. In other words, 
the group of criminal investigators answered more homogenously on a rather high level while 
experienced POs showed larger inter-individual differences in their response patterns. This 
could be an indicator for higher specialization although there was no significant difference in 
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mean performance between these groups. The groups of experienced POs and criminal 
investigators had a large range of work experience (4 to 32, 4 to 31 years respectively). It 
appears possible that this could have masked group differences in performance.  
We furthermore found that laypeople performed significantly above chance level 
(sequences 2 and 3), which is not in line with earlier findings from research on lie detection 
(DePaulo & Pfeifer, 1986; Vrij & Graham, 1997; Vrij & Mann, 2001; for review see Vrij, 
2008). It seems that detecting deceit in interrogation settings is more difficult than detecting 
deceit during the build-up phase of a criminal act. One possible explanation for this might be 
that, during an interrogation, all people (liars and truth-tellers alike) try to convince the 
interviewer that they are telling the truth. Strömwall et al. (2006) found that truth-tellers as 
well as liars mention similar strategies in verbal and nonverbal behavior, such as not making 
any excess movements and maintaining eye contact, in order to persuade the interviewer of 
their innocence. As a consequence, it becomes rather difficult to decide which statements are 
actually true. The idea of both, truth-tellers and liars, altering their behavior during 
interrogations, and the resulting absence of a reliable guideline for behavioral cues underlying 
truthful statements, might explain the rather poor performance in lie detection of law 
enforcement and students.  
The fact that observers in our study had the opportunity to directly compare possible 
suspects to other people who behaved normally might also provide a reason, why law 
enforcement performed rather well in our study as compared to Strömwall et al. (2006). In an 
interrogation setting as used by Strömwall et al. (2006), the observer interrogates a person 
without being able to compare the behavior directly to innocent people’s natural behavior. In 
our setting, offenders probably used certain strategies in order not to get caught, i.e., they tried 
to behave as naturally as possible. Paradoxically, however, trying to act naturally might in fact 
render them highly suspicious because all the other people do not follow any strategies but 
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rather concentrate on catching their plane. This illustrates that innocent people display a 
reference behavior that can be taken as “baseline”, i.e., behavior that is not influenced by any 
goal of making a certain impression on an observer.  
In order to detect deceptive behavior regarding lies, it seems helpful to observe 
clusters of behaviors instead of just one behavior or behavioral pattern in isolation (Vrij, 
2008). This statement is supported by own personal conversations with experienced criminal 
investigators. They reported that they perceive the scene as a whole and try to detect clusters 
of behavior that differ from the baseline. Findings of Gestalt psychology about figure-ground 
phenomena (Goldstein, 2007; Heubrock, Immerini, Mengeringhausen, & Palkies, 2009) 
support this approach. The visual system identifies objects using their outlines to discriminate 
between different objects. This is even possible if the outlines are not clearly visible; the 
visual system tries to make sense of the visual input, whereas prior experience influences 
what is perceived (Goldstein, 2007). Applied to the detection of suspicious behavior, the 
situation can be described as follows: observers are watching a crowd of people. If the 
observers do not have any prior knowledge about how criminals behave in preparing their 
crime, they cannot be detected. Detection is impossible or unlikely, because the observers’ 
visual system could not make sense of the information available and, thus, figure-ground 
segregation was impossible (Heubrock et al., 2009). 
However, if the observers know about the modus operandi (e.g., how a theft is 
committed), they may recognize a pattern which matches stored information. In this way they 
are able to distinguish the criminal as the “figure” from the background. This could explain 
our finding that inexperienced POs already, shortly after having completed the theoretical 
training, are able to detect thieves earlier in the build-up phase than laypeople. Thus, 
hypothesis 3 is confirmed. Apparently, the theoretical training had provided them with 
information on how thieves act so that they were subsequently able to detect their behavior as 
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“figure”. It may be that the representation strength of criminal behavior increases with 
training and/or professional experience. This might explain why criminal investigators 
performed better than inexperienced POs in our task. Our personal conversations with 
inexperienced POs and criminal investigators suggest that the criminal investigators’ 
knowledge about the modus operandi of thieves is far more sophisticated than the 
inexperienced POs’ knowledge.  
The existence of the investigator-bias is well established in lie detection research 
(Meissner & Kassin, 2002). The investigator-bias describes a response tendency towards 
suspecting lies rather than the truth. The results of Meissner and Kassin's (2002) meta-
analysis showed that responses of trained or experienced people are particularly biased 
towards lies. Furthermore, we know from Masip, Alonso, Garrido, and Antón, (2005) that 
experienced POs show higher scores on a generalized communicative suspicion scale, which 
measures the general suspiciousness of people, than undergraduates and even police recruits. 
Based on these findings, we had expected our POs to be more biased towards suspicion than 
laypeople as well (Hypothesis 4). The results disprove this assumption: Police recruits judge 
behavior already more often as suspicious as students of psychology do, even though they are 
still laypeople. Thus, the explanation offered by Anderson et al. (1999) for this phenomenon, 
namely that the exposition to lies in actual daily life is responsible for the shift in response 
tendency, seems to not hold true in our context of the detection of criminal intentions: police 
recruits, who are not more exposed to criminals than students of psychology, have shown the 
criterion shift as well. It appears thus likely that other factors such as the mindset or the 
motivation to find criminals contribute more to the criterion shift than target prevalence in 
daily life. Either Anderson et al.’s offered explanation is wrong, or different mechanisms are 
at play in the detection of lies versus criminal intentions. 
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The question of whether there is a bias towards innocence (similar to the truth-bias in 
lie detection) or a bias towards suspicion (similar to the investigator-bias in lie detection) in 
our data can easily be reconciled as follows: The question of who is biased in which way fully 
depends on the viewpoint one takes. From the students’ viewpoint, POs and police recruits 
have a suspicion-bias, since their response tendency C has significantly lower values. From 
the POs’ and the police recruits’ viewpoint, the students have an innocence-bias since their 
response tendency C has significantly higher values. From a neutral and scientific viewpoint, 
all groups are biased towards innocence (truth-bias) as all criterion values are positive and 
differ significantly from zero and that this bias is less pronounced in POs as well as police 
recruits compared to students of psychology.  
Our finding that detection performance improves with knowledge and expertise, while 
the response tendency seems to be rather influenced by one’s mindset and motivation to find 
criminals, extends previous research in lie detection (Meissner & Kassin, 2002; Masip et al., 
2005; see Vrij, 2008 for review) as well as behavior detection (Troscianko et al., 2004; Grant 
& Williams, 2011). In our view, the fact that there was a change in criterion already in the 
police recruits does not contradict the effect of target prevalence as described by Wolfe et al., 
(2007). We believe that target prevalence can serve as a reminder that stimuli exist and occur, 
which subsequently keeps awareness at a high level. Awareness might also be raised by 
mentally preparing (Gould, Flett, & Bean, 2009) for a task, though, which is exactly what 
police recruits do. Thus, in the case of the police recruits, the missing target prevalence in 
daily life may have been substituted by mental preparation about criminals. However, this 
increased awareness in police recruits did not have a positive influence on police recruits’ 
performance per se. Detection performance improved only with theoretical knowledge and 
work experience. This leads to the conclusion that in this case training can indeed improve 
detection performance independent of response tendency. 
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Whenever different populations are compared it can be argued that one population is 
more inherently motivated to perform well in the given task (Biggs, Cain, Clark, Darling, & 
Mitroff, 2013). In our study, POs could have been more motivated to perform well than 
students of psychology because preventing crimes is one of their main tasks. However, police 
recruits’ performance did not differ from the performance of students of psychology. The 
difference in response tendency, which could be an indicator for more eagerness to suspect 
people, did not affect detection performance. We thus believe that potential differences in 
motivation between the groups cannot explain the differences in performance we found. 
With the limitation that we only used one type of crime, namely theft, the present 
study empirically shows that it is possible to detect people who try to deceive based on their 
behavior before they commit the crime at least when they are observed on CCTV. It remains 
to be proven that this is also the case in real life. The kind of information that leads to this 
detection, i.e., whether there are specific signs or whether it is a more general kind of 
information, such as differences in behavior from the surrounding people, clearly warrants 
further study. Troscianko et al. (2004), for example, replayed some of the recordings to their 
participants and asked them to indicate when their suspiciousness was triggered. Afterwards, 
they analyzed the recordings frame by frame and found some nonverbal behavior cues to 
trigger suspiciousness rather often (i.e., distinctive gaits and hand gestures). It still remains to 
be investigated more thoroughly whether such detectable behaviors can indeed be specified.  
Altogether, our study gives important insights on the influence of knowledge and 
experience on people’s abilities to perform a complex visual search task, namely detecting 
criminals within a crowd based on their nonverbal behavior. In particular, our study provides 
basic findings that are highly relevant to general policing as well as behavior detection 
programs that are implemented at many airports. Our study showed that, firstly, offenders 
trying to be unsuspicious (i.e. trying to hide their criminal intentions) show behavior that 
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triggers suspicion. Secondly, observers can indeed detect hidden criminal intentions during 
the build-up phase of a criminal act based on nonverbal information only. Thirdly, this 
detection ability can be improved by training and practice. Further research is needed in order 
to obtain more information on which contents of the theoretical training lead to this increase 
in performance. 
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Abstract 
The present study investigates whether nonverbal behavioral cues to hidden criminal 
intentions during the build-up phase of a criminal act exist. To this end, we created recordings 
of actors once in a search situation and once committing a mock crime (theft or bomb placing) 
in a public crowded area. For ecological validation, we used authentic CCTV footage from 
thefts committed at an international airport in Experiment 1. In this experiment, moving 
patterns in public space and communication behavior were analyzed according to the 
difference of the expressed behavior in search and (mock) crime situations as well as 
compared to a bystanders’ baseline. Experiment 2 was conducted to examine object-adaptors 
and self-adaptors as the behaviors of interest while controlling for inter-personal differences. 
The results of this study indicate that nonverbal behavior of offenders differs from nonverbal 
behavior of non-offenders. However, this holds only under the conditions of a valid baseline 
and of judging not only a typical behavior but a cluster of nonverbal behaviors as behavioral 
indicators during the build-up phase of a criminal act. 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: 
Behavior detection; cues to hidden criminal intentions during the build-up phase; 
interpretation of nonverbal behavior; criminal intentions 
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3.1  Introduction 
Crime prevention is one of the police’s most important tasks. In order to perform well 
in this task, police officers need to be able to detect offenders before they commit a crime. As 
officers are usually not involved in conversations with offenders during the build-up phase of 
a crime, the detection most often relies on nonverbal behavioral cues as the only source of 
information. Crimes such as thefts, drug deals, and terrorist attacks, most often happen in 
public spaces. They can happen at train stations or airports with a large crowd of bystanders 
who are unaware of the crime being committed. Thus, in many cases, officers need to observe 
crowds of people in order to detect offenders before they commit the crime. During the build-
up phase, most offenders try to hide their criminal intentions to be successful. For example, 
thieves enter a public space with the criminal intention to steal valuables from an innocent 
person. In order to be successful, they need to appear inconspicuously since neither the future 
victim nor bystanders or security personnel must infer their criminal intentions. The attacks 
on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, for example, included a successful build-
up phase for every team of hijackers. Presumably, the intention to hijack these planes existed 
for a rather long time and the attack was very well planned (National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). The hijackers had to pass all security 
protocols on the airports successfully in order to fulfill their plan. It is known that some of 
these terrorists managed to hide their criminal intentions even though they were questioned by 
security personnel during the build-up phase (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
Upon the United States, 2004). 
These attacks in 2001 contributed to shaping the public awareness of terrorism being 
one of the biggest threats to society. Thus, with the U.S. and Israel taking the lead, several 
countries developed intelligence programs which are based on behavior detection during the 
build-up phase (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010). For example, the behavior 
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detection program of the U.S., SPOT (Screening Passenger by Observation Technique), is 
based on a checklist with (mostly nonverbal) cues which should indicate criminal intentions. 
Based on this checklist, behavior detection officers screen airports and other vulnerable 
infrastructure for these cues of interest. Firstly, the observers establish the baseline values for 
these cues in the current situation. In other words, they judge how strongly or how frequently 
the specified behavioral cues are expressed in the observed crowd overall. People who show 
nonverbal behavioral cues that added up reach a certain threshold are selected for further 
investigation by the police (Frank et al., 2009; U.S. Government Accountability Office, 
2010). As pointed out by Frey, Wetter, and Hofer (submitted), three premises have to be given 
for such programs to be effective: a) Offenders show nonverbal behavioral cues which 
indicate their criminal intentions and deviate from the baseline, b) Observers must be able to 
detect and interpret these cues correctly, and c) the detection and correct interpretation of such 
cues have to be teachable or trainable.  
Contrary to the detection of lies (see Kraut, 1980; Vrij, 2008 for review), detection 
performance of criminal intentions is above chance level. Frey et al. (submitted) showed that 
people are indeed able to detect deceptive offenders during the build-up phase. This extends 
the results of Troscianko et al. (2004), who found that it is possible to infer aggressive 
criminal behavior based on nonverbal cues. Troscianko's participants were shown CCTV 
recordings of the build-up phase of either aggressive unlawful acts, lawful social interactions 
which were similar to the unlawful acts (matches), or different social interactions. They were 
then asked to predict the outcome of the situations, in which they performed above chance 
level. Frey’s participants, however, were shown CCTV recordings of the build-up phase of 
real baggage thefts committed in a rather large crowd of people. The participants were given 
the opportunity to identify offenders at three different points in time during the build-up 
phase. Contrary to Troscianko et al. (2004), Frey’s participants knew that a crime (theft) 
would happen. They had to correctly identify the thieves among the innocent bystanders as 
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early as possible. The results show that laypeople perform above chance level shortly before 
the theft was committed. Police officers with different levels of professional experience 
outperformed laypeople significantly on all three time points during the measured build-up 
phase. The study indicates that police officers possess valuable knowledge about offenders’ 
behavior that seems to be helpful.  
The idea of nonverbal behavioral cues helping to identify hidden criminal intentions 
related to deception is very well studied within the area of lie detection research (Zuckerman 
et al., 1981; DePaulo et al., 2003; see Vrij, 2008 for review). Laypeople and professionals 
alike strongly believe in a reliable correlation between diagnostic nonverbal behavioral cues 
and lying (Mann et al., 2004; Sporer & Schwandt, 2007), although research mostly contradicts 
these beliefs (Vrij, 2008). Zuckerman et al. (1981) proposed the following three important 
factors, which influence nonverbal behavior and, therefore, can serve as possible cues in order 
to identify deception: a) emotional reactions, b) cognitive effort, and c) attempted behavioral 
control. 
Ekman and Friesen (1969b) and Ekman et al. (1987) showed that the facial 
expressions of basic emotions such as anger, happiness, fear, sadness, surprise, and disgust, 
are universal. In their work the authors also mention display rules, which are rules for 
managing facial expressions that are determined by culture and society. For example, as soon 
as an authorial person was placed in the same room as Japanese participants, they masked 
their felt emotions by smiling more (Ekman, 1998). Based on these results, it can be assumed 
that people might be able to control their nonverbal behavior, or at least their facial 
expressions, to some extent. More importantly, people tend to try to control their behavior 
under certain circumstances (J. K. Burgoon & Buller, 1994), and they try to display behavior 
that they believe is not associated with lies (Sporer & Schwandt, 2007).  
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According to Ekman (2009), the basic emotions underlying lies are guilt, fear, and 
delight. Fear, for example, could result in an increase of physical arousal and entail an 
increase of nonverbal behavior that indicates arousal. According to Vrij (2008), this could 
cause a higher frequency of cues such as eye blinks and/or self-adaptors (e.g. touching own 
hair, face). Nevertheless, negative emotions, such as fear and guilt, could also lead to 
withdrawal signs (Vrij, 2008). The same internal state could therefore lead to different 
nonverbal behavioral cues and this indicates the complexity of human behavior. In addition, 
many different internal states may underlie a hostile or criminal intention and these different 
internal states may be expressed in many different ways (J. K. Burgoon et al., 2009). 
Nevertheless, the nonverbal behavior expressed by people who try to hide their intentions in 
stressful situations might offer informative cues for security personnel. Until now, there is 
rather little empirical evidence for such nonverbal behavioral cues. Lie detection studies show 
rather ambiguous results and do not support typical nonverbal behavior cues to lying (Vrij, 
2008). Liars as well as offenders planning a criminal act both try to deceive. However, the 
two kinds of deception differ for at least two reasons. Firstly, the typical build-up phase of a 
criminal act is missing in an interrogation setting: as soon as the interrogation starts, the liar 
already takes action (Frey et al., submitted). During the build-up phase of a criminal act, on 
the other hand, the actual intended action, for example the theft, has not yet taken place. 
Secondly, an interrogation includes an interaction with at least one interviewer who has to be 
persuaded. A build-up phase of a criminal act mostly includes no direct interaction with 
security personnel, but the suspects need to hide their intentions by becoming one with the 
crowd.  
There is only very little research about possible nonverbal behavioral cues to criminal 
intentions during the build-up phase of a criminal act so far. Troscianko et al. (2004), for 
example, mentioned nonverbal behavioral cues that seem to be important for the correct 
prediction of aggressive behavior, such as distinctive gaits, hand gestures, looking away from 
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walking direction, and looking around repeatedly. Grant & Williams (2011) replicated and 
extended the findings by Troscianko et al. (2004) with eye tracking data. Their results indicate 
the importance of looking at the face/head of individuals who were not engaged in reciprocal 
social interactions. If individuals were engaged in social interactions, looking at their bodies 
was most successful. Heubrock et al. (2009b) and Heubrock (2011) conducted field studies in 
order to find out more about typical behaviors that reveal criminal intentions before 
assassinations. Heubrock et al. (2009b) asked participants to either try to “attack” and 
“murder” a person of interest with a realistic gun, or to give back a wallet to this person 
(control situation). The offenders had to become one with bystanders, act as inconspicuously 
as possible in order to reach their victim, and successfully solve their task. The authors 
conducted two experiments with this design. One of them took place in a small closed area, 
such as a classroom, whereas the other one took place in a foyer of a university, which was 
representative of a larger room with more bystanders. In the classroom situation, offenders 
showed a more rigid behavior in facial expressions, gestures, and the body than non-
offenders. In the foyer situation, offenders displayed a higher frequency of object-adaptors 
(use of objects like cell phone without instrumental goal) and self-adaptors (movements with 
hands on own body to calm oneself), as well as behavior that is typical for search and 
approach. In addition, Heubrock (2011) conducted a field study concerning nonverbal 
behavior of possible suitcase bombers with Islamic background in a public train station. He 
asked three participants to place a suitcase bomb within 10 minutes at a place where the 
largest amount of destruction would be reached. Three travelers, who had agreed to be filmed 
while trying to catch their train, served as controls. The author again found a higher frequency 
of object and self-adaptors, as well as more complex moving patterns in offenders.  
All these studies show promising results. However, additionally to the rather small 
sample size in the studies of Heubrock et al. (2009b) as well as Heubrock, (2011), all of the 
above mentioned studies suffer from the same shortcoming, namely, that different people 
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acted in the offender vs. non-offender situations. Thus, there is no control for inter-individual 
differences in behavior. In the studies mentioned above, the situations were kept similar, but 
the actors were different. In the worst case, people who always behave nervously might have 
been given the offender tasks, and people who are typically very calm might have been given 
the control task. This would result at least in an overestimation of the nonverbal cues. 
Therefore, it is very important to compare the same people in offender and non-offender 
situations.  
Eachus et al. (2013) conducted a field study on stress symptoms and behavioral cues 
of hostile reconnaissance in public crowded spaces controlling for possible inter-individual 
differences. They examined four factors which could be of importance for behavior detection 
during the build-up phase done by humans as well as machines; a) cortisol and stress 
pheromones as biological factor, b) heart-rate, respiration, and body temperature as 
physiological factor, c) subjective measures of stress by the State Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(STAI, Marteau & Bekker, 1992) as psychological factor, and d) possible behavioral cues 
found through analyses of CCTV recordings of two of the 20 offenders by 15 other 
participants as behavioral factor. There were three conditions: (1) twenty mock offenders 
were sitting quietly in a room for 15 minutes (baseline), (2) the offenders were asked to 
traverse the shopping mall on a given route and to take pictures at six given locations (low 
intent condition), (3) the offenders were asked to take the same route and pictures again, but 
they had to be 10% faster than before and had to make sure they stayed undetected by plain-
clothes security staff (high intent condition). The analyses of most measurements (Cortisol, 
Sterol, heart rate, respiration, and STAI) resulted in an increase in the high intent condition, 
which could not be fully explained by the higher physical activation in the high intent 
condition. Additionally, 15 participants analyzed the low and high intent videos of the person 
with the lowest STAI score and the person with the highest STAI score but found no 
differences in behavior. These results indicate on the one hand that laypeople indeed feel 
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different and stressed in mock crime situations, but, on the other hand, they contradict the 
findings mentioned before where some possible behavioral indicators for criminal intentions 
have been found (Troscianko et al., 2004; Heubrock et al., 2009b; Grant & Williams, 2011; 
Heubrock, 2011). Thus, it is not yet clear whether diagnostic nonverbal behavioral cues to 
criminal intentions can be found. The found ones may actually be behavioral artifacts due to 
the comparison of person A in situation A to person B in situation B. This would explain why 
Eachus et al. (2013) found no differences because they controlled for inter-individual 
differences. However, a shortcoming of this study was the rather small amount of recordings 
that was analyzed.  
In general, the present study aims at clarifying these ambiguous results focusing on 
deceptive offenders such as mock thieves and mock terrorists. In order to control for inter-
individual differences, we created our own recordings containing a mock crime and a control 
situation for every offender (team). The control situation consisted of a directed search for a 
(fictive) person (see method section for more details). In order to be able to compare the 
behavior of the same person in a mock crime and a control situation, we compared the 
recordings to these two conditions. 
In Experiment 1 we took a closer look at the behavior of offenders regarding moving 
pattern in public space and communication behavior. In addition, we validated our own video 
recordings with regard to the two behaviors of interest by comparing the results of our own 
recordings with CCTV recordings containing real crimes (thefts).  
We expected for all conditions (search, mock crime, real crime) a deviation in the 
strength of the behavior compared to the baseline, for moving patterns (Hypothesis 1a) as 
well as for communication behavior (Hypothesis 1b), since in all three conditions the persons 
of interest pursued an objective and tried to be successful. As criminals have to try to act as 
inconspicuously as possible in order to be successful, we expected this deviation being 
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smaller in mock as well as real crimes compared to the search condition for moving patterns 
(Hypothesis 2a) as well as for communication behavior (Hypothesis 2b), since trying to be as 
inconspicuously as possible can be defined as “trying to become one with the surrounding 
bystanders (= baseline)”. 
Besides the strength of behavior we were also interested in the kind of behaviors that 
are shown in the three conditions. We expected to find a difference in the kind of behavior in 
all three conditions for moving patterns (Hypothesis 3a) as well as for communication 
behavior (Hypothesis 3b). For the same reasons as with the strength of behavior we expected 
this difference to be smaller for mock and real crimes compared to the search condition for 
moving patterns (Hypothesis 4a) as well as for communication behavior (Hypothesis 4b).  
In Experiment 2 we took a closer look at self- and object-adaptors. We defined self-
adaptors according to Sporer and Schwandt (2007) as “duration or frequency of movements 
in which one hand is in contact with the other hand or other parts of the body or face, such as 
by rubbing or scratching” (p. 11). Object-adaptors were defined according to Ekman and 
Friesen (1972) as well as Heubrock (2011) as the use of an object rather in order to calm 
oneself than for its instrumental goal. We examined these two adaptors in detail based on the 
findings by Heubrock (2011) and Heubrock et al. (2009b), but also because of our personal 
conversations with criminal investigators. These personal conversations revealed hypotheses 
about positive correlations between self-adaptors and object-adaptors and criminal intentions. 
Similar assumptions of laypeople and professionals are found in lie detection research for self-
adaptors (Mann et al., 2004; The Global Deception Research Team, 2006; Sporer & 
Schwandt, 2007), although, in reality no correlations were found between lied statements and 
self-adaptors indicating that self-adaptors might not be a reliable cue (DePaulo et al., 2003). 
Research on lie detection is usually conducted in interrogation settings (Vrij, 2008). In 
addition to the above mentioned differences this setting differs from the setting during the 
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build-up phase of a criminal act as truth-tellers might also use strategies in order to persuade 
the interviewer not to mistake them for liars (DePaulo et al., 2003; Strömwall et al., 2006). 
Thus, the fact that no correlation between self-adaptors and telling a lie has been found might 
be due to the strategic behavior of truth-tellers and liars on the one hand, and/or the 
methodological problem of having different participants in truth vs. lie situations. During the 
build-up phase of a deceptive criminal act, such as a theft or placing a bomb, these 
correlations might be different from situations used in lie detection research for two reasons. 
First, we compare the same people once having a hidden criminal intention and once having a 
goal-driven but noncriminal intention. Thus, for every mock offender, we can differentiate 
nonverbal behavioral cues due to criminal intentions from nonverbal behavioral cues in 
situations with a goal-driven but noncriminal intention. Second, our search (control) condition 
differs from the truth condition in interrogation settings insofar that there is no need for 
persuading for example an interviewer of something. Thus, in the search (control) condition 
there is no need for any alteration of people’s behavior. Based on the above mentioned 
hypotheses found in personal conversations, we, therefore, expect stronger presence of self- 
(Hypothesis 5a) and object-adaptors (Hypothesis 5b) in the mock crime condition than in the 
control search condition
1
. 
3.2.  General method 
3.2.1  Used scenarios 
Two different scenarios, namely a search condition (control situation), and a mock 
crime condition, were recorded on video. These recordings served as basic material for both 
experiments. Laypeople were chosen as “actors” in these situations based on the results by 
Eachus et al. (2013) mentioned in the introduction. Since different people show different 
                                                 
1
 The rather low quality and the distance view of CCTV recordings containing real crimes did not allow for using 
them in Experiment 2. Therefore, no hypothesis could be tested in this context although we would as in 
Experiment 1 expect no difference between mock and real crimes. 
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nonverbal behavior (Dente et al., 2006), we had each actor or pair of actors acting in both 
conditions. It is important to note that these actors were not instructed to play act, but that 
they believed to be part of training for criminal investigators (see cover story) in both 
conditions. 
The search (control) condition consisted of the task to search for another person. The 
mock crime condition consisted of the task to either commit a theft, or to place a mock bomb 
in such a way that a target victim or as many people as possible would be killed. In both sorts 
of crimes, there is a build-up phase during which the offenders try to hide their criminal 
intentions. The conditions were staged in three public areas, namely a large international 
airport, a large train station, or a public interchange place in order to account for possible 
differences in behavior due to the location where the mock crime is committed. 
3.2.2  Actors and cover story 
Thirteen security control officers at a large international airport acted as mock 
offenders. Ten of them operated in teams of two, three of them acted alone. They were told 
they would participate as mock offenders in a training for criminal investigators, where the 
criminal investigators have to observe a crowd to find possible offenders without being 
identified as criminal investigators themselves. Before the mock offenders were instructed 
about their task, the search condition was recorded in which they were told to search another 
(non-existing) instructor in order to get more information for the (later mock crime) scene 
area. In order to receive enough material this task always lasted at least five minutes and 
maximally ten minutes. In this search (control) condition, the mock offenders did neither try 
to hide any criminal intention nor act as inconspicuously as possible. We decided to use a 
search instead of a “doing nothing” situation in order to make sure that there is a clear goal in 
every condition and in order to later be able to distinguish the behavior due to hiding of 
criminal intentions from mere active search behavior.   
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For the mock crime condition, we instructed our mock offenders a second time and 
told them that they should try to deceive the criminal investigators that were to be trained. 
Thus, the mock offenders had to commit the crime in such a way that the investigators would 
not be able to identify them as the offenders. They were given ten minutes to go into the 
situation, commit their crime, and leave the situation again. Our actors were not aware of the 
fact that no criminal investigators were there to be deceived. The “victims” in the mock crime 
condition consisted of laypeople that were told that they would participate in a field study on 
attention in real world scenarios. They were instructed to read a story from a children’s book 
in a crowded and noisy public place and that they later would have to answer questions about 
the book’s content. Thus, they were distracted by a cognitive task as well as by the crowded 
place, so that their ecological validity as mock victims was given. 
All actors were informed beforehand that they will be recorded on video, and written 
consent to the study and the recordings was obtained from them. They were also made aware 
of the possibility to withdraw their written consent at any time. After completion of their 
tasks, all actors received a thorough debriefing about the main objective of the study.  
3.2.3  Video recordings 
All situations were recorded by two overview cameras (further called space condition) 
and three to five cameras which zoomed in on the offenders (further called zoom condition). 
In order to obtain zoom recordings in which the mock offenders are always visible, a naïve 
person cut out the parts where the camera lost focus, where the mock offender walked out of 
the image, or where public transportation drove in between the mock offender and the camera. 
The duration of these recordings varied due to differences in the duration of the build-up 
phase, which was dependent on the mock offenders’ way of committing the mock crime 
(space condition: M = 196.13 s; SD = 94.78 s). Some of the recordings of the zoom condition 
were shortened due to the above-mentioned cutting (zoom condition: M = 175.15 s; SD = 
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83.09 s). Each mock crime recording ended shortly before the mock crime was committed, 
thus only showing the build-up phase. The recordings of the search (control) conditions were 
cut to the same length as the according mock crime recordings. We used eight packages of 
recordings; detailed information about the mock crimes, number of offenders, duration and 
locations is shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1  
Own video recordings: type of mock crime, number of offenders, duration, and location. Note that duration and 
location and number of offenders were the same for the search (control) condition. 
 Mock crime Offenders Duration in s for 
space and zoom (both 
offenders) 
Location 
Package 1 
 
Bomb 
 
1 Space: 143 s 
Zoom: 87 s  
Airport 
 
     
Package 2 
 
Theft 2 Space: 209 s 
Zoom: 173 s / 193 s 
Airport 
     
Package 3 
 
Theft 
 
2 Space: 93 s 
Zoom: 134 s / 94 s 
Train station 
 
     
Package 4 
 
Bomb 
 
1 Space: 86 s 
Zoom: 95 s 
Train station 
 
     
Package 5 
 
Theft 
 
2 Space: 180 s 
Zoom: 134 s / 103 s 
Train station 
 
     
Package 6 
 
Bomb 
 
1 Space: 243 s 
Zoom: 162 s 
Train station 
 
     
Package 7 
 
Theft 
 
2 Space: 288 s 
Zoom: 188 s / 262 s 
Public interchange station 
 
     
Package 8 
 
Theft 
 
2 Space: 363 s 
Zoom: 315 s / 336 s 
Public interchange station 
 
 
As a complement to the recordings with actors, we used real CCTV recordings of 
baggage thefts at a large international airport. These were cut shortly before the theft was 
committed so that they again only showed the build-up phase of the crime. The length of each 
recording was defined by the offenders’ way to commit the crime (M = 87.20 s; SD = 38.22 
s). For a detailed description of these CCTV recordings, see Frey et al. (submitted). 
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3.3  Experiment 1 – Moving patterns and communication behavior 
In Experiment 1, we were interested in moving patterns in public space as well as 
nonverbal communication behavior in general. Based on personal conversations with criminal 
investigators we were interested in abrupt changes in direction or speed, and position changes 
as behavioral cues relating to moving patterns. We furthermore analyzed hand signs, hand 
movements, use of cell phone, lip movements, and gaze movements as nonverbal behavioral 
cues for communication behavior.  
3.3.1  Participants 
Eighteen undergraduate students of the University of Zurich participated. Seventeen 
participants were female and one was male, with an average age of 24.56 years (SD = 6.60). 
They were either paid according to the usual conditions at the University of Zurich (i.e., CHF 
15 per hour) or received course credits. All participants were naïve to the actual background 
of the experiment, as experience and expectations can influence the perception of nonverbal 
behavior (Levine, Asada, & Park, 2006; Fuhrer, 2013). At the end of the experiment, 
participants were debriefed thoroughly about the reasons of the study. They were also 
informed of the possibility to withdraw their consent at any time.  
3.3.2  Stimuli 
In this experiment, we only used the recordings of the space condition. Thus, there 
were ten authentic CCTV recordings of real baggage thefts. Additionally, we used the eight 
space condition recordings of the mock crimes and the according eight searches. This resulted 
in a total of 26 stimuli which were divided into two sessions with 13 stimuli each. If a 
participant saw the mock crime recording of Person A in session 1, he/she saw the search of 
Person A in session 2 (Version A), and vice versa (Version B). Within one session, all 
recordings were presented in random order and each session contained five of the ten CCTV 
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recordings. Half of the participants saw version A, the other half saw version B. Participants 
were randomly assigned to these versions.  
3.3.3  Procedure 
Participants were asked to participate in this experiment on two different days. Each 
session lasted one hour. The experiment combined computer-based and paper-pencil methods. 
Instructions and recordings were presented on a computer using the java-based open-source 
programming framework Tatool (von Bastian, Locher, & Ruflin, 2013). The participants 
responded on paper to give them the possibility to easily re-check the list of relevant 
behaviors of interest while watching the recordings.  
At the beginning, the participants were informed that they would participate in an 
experiment about nonverbal behavior in public places. They were told that they were going to 
watch video recordings, for which they would assess nonverbal behavior of pre-defined 
persons of interest. The detailed definition of the relevant nonverbal behaviors of interest that 
had to be judged was followed by an instruction check. In the instruction check, participants 
were shown two different recordings containing simple examples of the behavior of interest. 
After each recording, they had to indicate which of the two behavior groups (either moving 
patterns in public space or communication behavior) they observed. Performance was 
reviewed by the investigator: if the answers were not correct, more instruction would have 
followed, which never happened. After this instruction check, the concept of the baseline was 
explained as “How strongly do the other people in the recording show this behavior? How 
strongly would you expect this behavior to be shown in this situation?” Then, the response 
sheet was explained in detail. Participants had to indicate separately for each behavior group 
(moving patterns and communication behavior) on a visual analogue scale: a) how strongly 
the behavior was shown by the other people (baseline), b) how strongly the behavior was 
shown by the people of interest, c) how strongly the kind of behavior shown by the people of 
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interest differed from the kind of behavior shown by the baseline. In addition, participants had 
to indicate which of the following behaviors they had observed for moving patterns (abrupt 
changes of direction, abrupt changes in speed, changes of position, own observations) and for 
communication behavior (hand signs, head movements, use of cell phone or phone booth, lip 
movements, gaze movements, own observations). We instructed them that the explicitly 
mentioned kinds of behavior were not exclusive for the behavior of interest groups. Thus, 
they were instructed to note what other behaviors they observed and found notable in the 
category own observation. After the instruction was finished, an example recording was 
shown to give participants the possibility to get used to the procedure.  
The first frame of each recording was presented as a still, in which the people of 
interest were marked with red circles. The recording started automatically after eight seconds. 
A slide was presented at the end of each recording, which asked the participants to give their 
responses. At the end of the first session, the participants were asked to participate in the 
second session. At the end of the second session, the participants were thoroughly debriefed 
about the background and the research questions of the experiment, the mock crimes, and the 
searches. 
3.3.4  Results 
We standardized the answers of all visual analogue scales into values from 0 (behavior 
was not shown at all) to 100 (behavior was maximally shown), in order to express deviations 
in terms of percentage. In order to test hypothesis 1a and 1b, we calculated the deviation from 
the baseline separately for each behavior of interest (moving patterns and communication 
behavior), i.e., we subtracted the standardized value that was indicated for the baseline from 
the standardized value for the person(s) of interest for each participant and each recording. As 
we were not primarily interested in the direction of the deviation from the baseline, i.e., 
whether the person(s) of interest showed the behavior of interest more or less strongly than 
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the people who formed the baseline, but rather in the question whether the strength of the 
behavior of interest differs at all we used the absolute values for statistical analyses. Based on 
these absolute values, we calculated one-sample T-tests for each behavior of interest in order 
to analyze whether the deviation from the baseline is significant. In all conditions, all judged 
behaviors deviate significantly from the baseline, which is zero in our case (moving patterns 
and communication behavior: p < .001, for all conditions). This indicates that in all 
conditions, the strength of the behavior of interest was consistently perceived to differ for the 
person(s) of interest compared to the baseline. Thus, hypotheses 1a and 1b are confirmed.  
To test hypotheses 2a and 2b, we calculated two separate analyses of variance 
(ANOVAs) for moving patterns and communication behavior with condition (search, mock 
crime, and real crime) as within-subjects variable. The respective data is displayed in Figure 
1.  
 
Figure 1. Mean absolute differences in % between the behaviors observed in the person(s) of interest and the 
baseline (zero). Error bars represent confidence intervals (95%) for within-subject comparisons calculated 
according to Cousineau (2005) and Morey (2008). 
Pairwise comparisons are always adjusted for multiple comparisons according to 
Bonferroni. The ANOVA for moving patterns showed a significant effect of condition, F(2, 
34) = 7.234, p = .002, η² = .298, indicating a difference in the absolute value of deviation 
from the baseline for at least one of the conditions. The pairwise comparisons confirmed 
significant differences between mock crime and search (p = .001), and real crime and search 
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(p = .046). Figure 1 shows that the deviance from the baseline is smaller in the two crime 
conditions compared to the search condition, confirming hypothesis 2a. There was no 
significant difference between mock crimes and real crimes (p = 1.000), thus underpinning 
the high external validity of the mock crime recordings. The ANOVA for communication 
behavior revealed no significant effect of condition, F(2, 34) = 2.734, p = .079, η² = .139. 
Thus, Hypothesis 2b cannot be confirmed. 
A descriptive analysis indicates how many percent of the difference values were 
negative, and how many percent of the difference values were positive for the behavior of 
interest as compared to the baseline. Figure 2 reveals that most difference values were 
positive, i.e., the behavior of interest was more strongly expressed by the person(s) of interest 
as compared to the baseline. For communication behavior, the pattern appears to be less 
uniform, particularly in the condition “real crime”. 
 
Figure 2. Percentage of participants who reported positive vs. negative deviation from the baseline for each 
behavior of interest (moving patterns and communication behavior) and condition (search, mock crime, and real 
crime). 
Figure 3 shows the averaged values expressed in terms of percentage for the answers 
to the question “how strongly differed the kind of behavior observed in the person(s) of 
interest from the kind of behavior observed in the baseline?” from zero (not at all) to 100 
(very strongly) for each behavior of interest (moving patterns and communication behavior) 
and condition (search, mock crime, and real crime). One-sample T-tests with these values 
Chapter 3 – What is suspicious when trying to be inconspicuous? 
 
 72 
 
showed significant differences from zero for both behaviors of interest (moving patterns and 
communication behavior) in all conditions (p < .001), thus confirming hypotheses 3a and 3b.  
 
Figure 3. Mean values (%) indicating how strongly the kind of behavior observed in the person(s) of interest 
differed from the kind of behavior observed in the baseline for each behavior of interest (moving pattern and 
communication) and condition (search, mock crime, and real crime). Error bars represent confidence intervals 
(95%) for within-subject comparisons calculated according to Cousineau (2005) and Morey (2008). 
The ANOVA for moving patterns with the data displayed in Figure 3 showed a 
significant effect of condition, F(2, 34) = 9.067, p = .001, η² = .348, indicating that the 
answers regarding the kinds of behavior differed between at least two conditions. Pairwise 
comparisons showed significant differences in moving patterns being between mock crime 
and search (p = .001), and real crime and search (p = .018). There was again no significant 
difference between mock crime and real crime (p = .663). Based on these results and the data 
displayed in Figure 3, hypothesis 4a can be confirmed. In contrast, the ANOVA for 
communication behavior showed no significant effect of condition, F(2, 34) = 2.380, p = .108, 
η² = .123. Thus, hypothesis 4b is not confirmed. 
For explorative purposes, we looked more closely at the different kinds of behaviors 
that were indicated by the participants. As dependent variable, we calculated the percentage of 
how often per condition the box of each behavior was checked. For communication behavior 
we excluded the behaviors lip and gaze movements in the condition real crime, because they 
were actually not visible due to the low quality of CCTV recordings. All behaviors of interest 
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that could have been mentioned by the participants are displayed in Table 2 and the resulting 
data is displayed in Figure 4a for moving patterns and Figure 4b for communication 
behavior. It has to be kept in mind that these results only cover responses to the behaviors that 
we had indicated on the questionnaire.  
 
Table 2  
Examples for the kind of behavior included in the concepts used as behaviors of interest for Experiment 1. Note 
that these behaviors were included in the response sheet with an added category “own observations”, see 
Table 3. These categories were not exclusive. 
Behaviors of interest 
Moving patterns Communication behavior 
Abrupt/many direction changes Hand signs 
  
Abrupt/many speed changes Head movements 
  
Many position changes Use of phone booths / cellphones 
  
 Lip/mouth movements 
  
 Gaze movements 
  
 
Participants could note further behaviors they found notable in the category own 
observations. For the sake of completeness, these notes are displayed in Table 3.  
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Table 3  
Summarized notes of participants in category “own observations” for moving patterns and communication 
behavior split per condition (search, mock crime, and real crime). 
Behaviors of interest 
Moving patterns Communication behavior 
Search Mock crime Real crime Search Mock crime Real crime 
Remove jacket Knows where to 
go 
From moving 
systematically to 
moving in a 
confused way 
Looks down Approach others 
 
 
 
Use of Check-in 
station 
Hands in 
face/hair 
Sitting Puts on hood Empty look Communicates 
with strangers 
Takes baggage 
trolley without 
real reason 
Reading schedule Hands in pockets Waiting Takes pictures Smells flowers  
Hands on hips Leaning arm on 
railing 
Watches baggage 
of strangers 
Don’t know 
where to go 
Large distance 
between team 
members 
 
Lean on railing Smoke cigarettes Smoke cigarettes Interaction Talked a lot to 
each other 
 
To point to sth Small distance 
towards strangers 
Turn around on 
place 
Searching 
 
 
Few movements Throws sth into 
the garbage 
Systematical 
position changes 
Seems as if they 
don’t know each 
other  
 
Waiting Strolling Searches hectically Folding their 
arms  
 
Pause Changes position 
systematically 
Moving fast from 
left to right and 
back 
Distance 
communication 
 
 
Confused Searching Takes hands 
behind back 
Touches other’s 
shoulder  
 
Bored Turn around on 
place 
Searches Touches other 
people  
 
Squeeze between 
suitcases 
Studying plates Squeeze between 
suitcases 
Looks around all 
the time  
 
Distance between 
team member 
changes 
Confused   
 
 
Tapping the floor 
by foot 
Moves fast   
 
 
 Separate and 
come together 
  
 
 
      
We calculated an ANOVA for each behavior that had been indicated explicitly on the 
questionnaire in both behaviors of interest groups. These ANOVAs featured condition 
(search, mock crime, real crime) as independent variable. Afterwards, pairwise comparisons 
(Bonferroni) were calculated.  
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a) 
 
b) 
 
Figure 4. Percentage of participants who observed the according kind of moving pattern (a) and 
communication behavior (b) per condition. Error bars represent confidence intervals (95%) for within-
subject comparisons calculated according to Cousineau (2005) and Morey (2008). 
The ANOVA for direction changes showed a significant effect of condition, F(2, 34) 
= 27.872, p < .001, η² = .621. Pairwise comparisons showed a significant difference between 
real crime and search as well as mock crime (both p < .001), and no significant difference 
between mock crime and search (p = 1.000). The ANOVA for speed changes showed a 
significant effect of condition as well, F(2, 34) = 11.198, p < .001, η² = .397. Pairwise 
comparisons showed a significant difference between real crime and mock crime (p = .001), 
and real crime and search (p = .010). There was no significant difference between mock crime 
and search (p = 1.000). The ANOVA for position changes showed a significant effect of 
condition, F(1.486, 25.255) = 32.435, p < .001, η² = .656 (Greenhouse-Geisser). Pairwise 
comparisons showed a significant difference between all conditions (mock crime vs. search: p 
< .001; mock crime vs. real crime: p < .001; real crime vs. search: p = .014). The ANOVA for 
hand signs showed no significant effect of condition, F(2, 34) = 2.564, p = .092, η² = .131. 
The ANOVA for head movements showed a significant effect of condition, F(2, 34) = 88.880, 
p < .001, η² = .839. Pairwise comparisons displayed a significant difference between real 
crime and search as well as mock crime (both: p < .001), but no significant difference 
between mock crime and search (p =.118). The ANOVA for the use of cellphone / phone 
booths showed a significant effect of condition, F(2, 34) = 37.630, p < .001, η² = .689. 
Pairwise comparisons showed a significant difference between search and mock crime as well 
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as real crime (both: p < .001), but no significant difference between mock crime and real 
crime (p = .685). Pairwise comparisons for lip movements (t(17) = -.809, p = .430) and gaze 
movements (t(17) = -1.022, p = .321) showed no significant differences between mock crime 
and search.  
3.4  Experiment 2 – Object-adaptors and self-adaptors 
In this experiment, we focused on self-adaptors (Sporer & Schwandt, 2007; Heubrock, 
2011) and object-adaptors (Ekman & Friesen, 1972; Heubrock, 2011). We examined whether 
self-adaptors and object-adaptors are expressed differently by the same person when 
performing a goal-driven search without criminal intention vs. pursuing a criminal goal, the 
latter requiring the participants to try to act as inconspicuously as possible.  
3.4.1  Participants 
Sixteen participants with an average age of 24 years (SD = 4.425) took part in this 
study. Ten of them were undergraduate students of psychology, one had already finished the 
master’s degree in psychology. Five participants were no students and worked outside the 
university. Twelve participants were female. They were all naïve to the actual goal of the 
study for the same reason as in Experiment 1. All participants were either paid according the 
usual conditions of University of Zurich (15 CHF/h) or received course credit after having 
participated in both sessions. They signed an informed consent and were aware of the 
possibility to withdraw from the study at any time. 
3.4.2 Stimuli 
The same eight recording packages as in Experiment 1 served as stimuli. In contrast to 
Experiment 1, only the zoom condition was used. Therefore, every situation of every offender 
was included, which resulted in a total of 26 recordings (5 offender teams = 10 searches, 10 
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mock crimes; 3 single offenders = 3 searches, 3 mock crimes). These recordings were 
distributed into two sessions in a quasi-randomized way insofar that one of the two recordings 
of each offender was shown in session 1 and the other in session 2. Additionally, we made 
sure that approximately the same amount of mock crime and search recordings were displayed 
in every Block (Block A: 7 searches, 6 crimes; Block B: 6 searches, 7 crimes). The Block 
order was counterbalanced insofar that half of the participants saw Block A in session 1 and 
Block B in session 2; the other half saw it vice versa. 
3.4.3  Procedure 
All participants were asked to participate in the experiment on two different days. The 
procedure was the same as in Experiment 1. The detailed instruction about the task was again 
displayed on the computer, and the participants answered on paper. For the instruction check, 
we again showed them recordings with examples of object-adaptors and self-adaptors. After 
each recording, participants had to indicate which behavior of interest was shown. The 
experimenter observed their answers and explained the task and the concepts in more detail if 
needed. Contrary to the recordings in Experiment 1, bystanders were not visible, and neither 
did participants have a full and clear view of the area. Thus, participants could not establish a 
baseline. Therefore, participants had to give their answers only on one visual analogue scale 
per behavior of interest, namely: “how strongly was this behavior shown by the person of 
interest?”. In addition to their answer on the visual analogue scale, participants could indicate 
which kind of explicitly asked self-adaptors or object-adaptors they observed (see Table 4 for 
details) using check boxes. In addition, they could note additional nonverbal behavior that 
they found notable in the category own observations (see Table 5 for details).  
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Table 4  
Examples for the kind of behavior included in the concepts used as behaviors of interest for Experiment 2. Note 
that these behaviors were included in the response sheet with an added category “own observations”, see 
Table 5. These categories were not exclusive. 
Behaviors of interest 
Object-adaptor Self-adaptor 
Use of Cellphone without instrumental goal Hand movements in the face 
  
Actions performed on own things to calm oneself  
(e.g. dig in bag) 
Hand movements in the hair 
  
Actions performed on external objects to calm oneself Hand movements on whole body 
  
 Fidgeting 
  
 Hand wringing 
  
 Touch and scrub one’s own clothing 
  
 
Table 5  
Summarized notes of participants in category “own observations” for self-adaptors and object-adaptors split 
by condition (search, mock crime). 
Behaviors of interest 
Self-adaptors Object-adaptors 
Search Mock crime Search Mock crime 
Hands often in pockets Pressing lips together Studies map Actions on other person 
Mouth twitches Hands in pockets Plays around with bag Chewing gum 
Clenching one‘s fists Wringing fingers Leans over railing Observes other people 
Stretches the neck Scratching wrist Tapping the floor by foot Use of phone booth 
Fidgeting on jacket Playing with fingers Plays around with ring Checking watch 
Scratches hands Moving around Holds jacket Drinking a lot 
Holds jacket Scratching the head Puts bag down next to 
himself 
Fidgeting on bag 
Hands on collar Folding his arms  Cigarettes 
Making gestures Making gestures  Tries out phone booth 
Bites on lips Drawing on hand  Holds the railing 
Folded arms moved   Studies schedule / map 
Folds hands behind back   Reads the newspaper 
Scratching    
    
 
3.4.4  Results 
As in Experiment 1, we first standardized the answers given on the visual analogue 
scales into values from zero (not at all) to 100 (very strongly) in order to express deviations in 
terms of percentage. After standardization, we calculated a difference value for each person of 
interest between his/her mock crime and search (control) condition. Thus, we subtracted the 
value in the search (control) condition from the value in the mock crime condition for every 
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person of interest. Contrary to Experiment 1, we were interested in the direction of deviation, 
because we hypothesized that object-adaptors as well as self-adaptors would be more 
strongly shown in the mock crime condition as compared to the search (control) condition. 
Figure 5 displays the average values over all persons of interest and all participants. 
 
Figure 5. Deviation (%) in frequency of self-adaptors and object-adaptors from the control search situation 
(zero). Positive values indicate more expression in the mock crime situation, whereas negative a value indicate 
stronger expression in the control search situation. Error bars represent confidence intervals (95%) for within-
subject comparisons for each behavior of interest calculated according to Cousineau (2005) and Morey (2008). 
First, we calculated a one-sample T-test against zero for each behavior of interest. This 
test showed a significant difference for object-adaptors (t(15) = 9.865, p < .001) as well as 
self-adaptors (t(15) = -3.681, p = .002). The data in Figure 5 reveal a positive deviation from 
zero for object-adaptors and a negative deviation from zero for self-adaptors, which partially 
hypothesis 5a: object-adaptors were indeed expressed more strongly in mock crime than in 
search (control) condition. However, hypothesis 5b could not be confirmed: self-adaptors 
were expressed less strongly in the mock crime condition than in the search (control) 
condition.  
Second, we were interested in what kind of behavior the participants actually 
observed. Again, it has to be kept in mind that this question was independent of the first one 
about how strongly the behavior was shown, because the given kinds of behavior were not 
exclusive. For the sake of completeness, Table 5 lists the kinds of behavior that participants 
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additionally noted in the category own observations. For the explicitly stated kinds of 
behavior (see Table 4 for details), we calculated for each condition the percentage of 
participants who mentioned that kind of behavior of interest. These data are displayed in 
Figure 6a for object-adaptors and Figure 6b for self-adaptors.  
a)  
 
 b) 
 
Figure 6. The percentage that the according kind of object-adaptor (a) or self-adaptor (b) was observed by 
participants in each condition. Error bars represent confidence intervals (95%) for within-subject comparisons, 
calculated according to Cousineau (2005) and Morey (2008). 
We subsequently calculated paired T-Tests for each kind of behavior of interest. The 
detailed statistics are displayed in Table 6. For these multiple comparisons, we lowered the 
significance level to p < .01 according to Bonferroni. The calculations resulted in a significant 
difference between mock crime and search for all kinds of object-adaptors and for the self-
adaptor hands in hair. The evaluated object-adaptors as well as the self-adaptor hands in hair 
were all judged to occur more strongly in the mock crime condition, all other comparisons 
were not significant.  
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Table 6 
T-tests for the use of object-adaptors and self-adaptors in mock crime vs. search (control) conditions. 
  
Pairs mock crime vs. search 
 
T 
 
df 
Significance 
(two-sided, 
Bonferroni) 
Object-adaptors Use of cellphone without instrumental goal 11.915 15 .000* 
     
 Actions performed on own things to calm oneself   6.376 15 .000* 
     
 Actions performed on external objects to calm oneself 7.188 15 .000* 
     
Self-adaptors Hand movements in the face 1.542 15 .144 
     
 Hand movements in the hair 4.779 15 .000* 
     
 Hand movements on whole body -.731 15 .476 
     
 Fidgeting -2.390 15 .030 
     
 Hand wringing 2.049 15 .058 
     
 Touch and scrub one’s own clothing -1.165 15 .262 
     
 
3.5  Discussion 
The main objective of this study was to investigate whether nonverbal behavioral cues 
can be identified that are related to hidden criminal intentions during the build-up phase. 
These nonverbal behavioral cues can consist of moving patterns, communication behavior, 
self-adaptors, and object-adaptors. Our study is the first one to use a combination of 
recordings of real crimes and own recordings of mock crimes and a search (control) condition 
for investigating the above research question. The use of this material permitted us to control 
for inter-individual differences as well as to demonstrate the external validity of our own 
recordings. Searching for a fictive person as control condition made it possible to later 
exclude nonverbal behavioral cues to mere search behavior (i.e., criminals need to search the 
perfect victim or place) from nonverbal behavioral cues to hidden criminal intentions. The 
results of this study indicate that offenders differ significantly from non-offenders in their 
nonverbal behavior.  
Chapter 3 – What is suspicious when trying to be inconspicuous? 
 
 82 
 
In our first experiment, we found a significant deviance from the baseline for both 
moving patterns and communication behavior in mock crimes, real crimes, as well as in the 
search (control) condition. In other words, independent of the intention the persons of interest 
had, their nonverbal behavior deviated from the behavior of bystanders.  
Heubrock (2011) found in his field study a more complex moving pattern of offenders 
than non-offenders (regular travelers). He describes the moving patterns for regular travelers 
as more straightforward and less complex, which would be in line with our interpretation. Our 
results complement the results by Heubrock (2011) by showing that moving patterns for 
people actively searching someone deviate even more strongly from the baseline than moving 
patterns of offenders. This finding is important as it shows that the premise “the stronger the 
deviation in moving pattern the more suspicious“ is clearly wrong. Thus, a strong deviation in 
moving patterns can also be expressed by people without any criminal intentions. It may even 
be hypothesized that the (mock) offenders successfully tried to adapt their moving patterns to 
the baseline in order to convey the impression of being regular travelers. They may have 
successfully tried masking their real intentions by a behavior that appears as inconspicuous as 
possible. Thus, they may have tried to become one with the crowd of bystanders. This is in 
line with the already known fact that people try to control their behavior while trying to deceit 
(Ekman & Friesen, 1969b; Ekman, 1981; J. K. Burgoon & Buller, 1994; Vrij, 2008). 
Nevertheless, their criminal intentions “leaked” and expressed themselves in an observable 
deviation in moving patterns from the baseline. We did not find any differences between the 
three conditions for communication behavior, i.e., their deviations from the baseline are 
comparable in size. This rather unexpected result might stem from the control condition, 
which consisted of a goal-driven active search. A team of actors actively searching somebody 
might need the same amount of communication as offenders searching for the perfect victim.  
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We did not find the same pattern in the qualitative data on the observed moving 
patterns. Because we found no difference between mock and real crime in moving patterns in 
the comparison of person(s) of interest and baseline, we would have expected to find no 
difference between real and mock crimes concerning the explicit kinds of behaviors too. 
However, there was always a significant difference between real and mock crimes as well as 
searches for all three explicit kinds of behaviors. This result might be an artifact of the 
situational area since, contrary to the difference value for the moving patterns, these data are 
independent from the actual baseline. All CCTV recordings, and, therefore, all real crimes 
were recorded at a large international airport, but only two of our own recording packages 
were recorded at the same airport. Additionally, the crimes in the CCTV recordings were 
thefts exclusively, in our own recordings the crimes varied between thefts and terrorist acts. It 
might be the case that some explicit behaviors are more often expressed at an airport than for 
example at a public interchange station due to the architectural circumstances of the place 
(e.g., Hoogendoorn & Bovy, 2004). Thus, these explicit behaviors would automatically be 
observed more in CCTV recordings than in others, because the underlying baseline would 
already be higher in this situational area. For example, at an airport, bystanders might express 
more abrupt direction and speed changes as well as position changes than at a train station 
because of the architectural circumstances or the fact that people are less familiar with the 
airport. Thus, to become one with the crowd, offenders might as well try to express these 
behaviors more often at an airport than for example at a train station. 
Alternatively, the different kinds of crimes could also lead to a different kind of 
explicit kind of moving pattern. For example, committing a theft might need more abrupt 
direction changes and speed changes than placing a bomb since, in the first case, the 
offenders might need to approach the victim more closely in order to steal. Thus, the fact that 
these explicit moving patterns were mentioned more often in the real crime condition could 
also be due to either architectural circumstances or the nature of the crime, or a combination 
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of both. However, as soon as the whole cluster of these nonverbal behaviors is taken into 
account, the amount of deviation of the moving patterns of real offenders and mock offenders 
does not differ anymore: The distribution of negative and positive deviations from the 
baseline looks similar for mock crimes and real crimes (Figure 2). This underlines the high 
importance of using the concept of a baseline and clusters of behaviors when judging other 
people’s behavior. 
In Experiment 2, we took a closer look at adaptors while controlling for inter-
individual differences. Self-adaptors (e.g., Sporer & Schwandt, 2007) and object-adaptors 
(Heubrock et al., 2009b) are often believed to be reliable cues to deception when lying is 
concerned. Both were found with a higher frequency in offenders than non-offenders in the 
field studies by (Heubrock et al., 2009b) and Heubrock (2011). However, these results might 
be artefacts of the comparison of different people in the mock crime and control situations. 
With the use of our search (control) condition, we not only excluded possible inter-individual 
differences but also nonverbal behavioral cues due to the search part of the criminal act. We 
found in our study significantly more object-adaptors and less self-adaptors in the mock 
crime condition compared to the search (control) condition. 
Contrary to our expectations, self-adaptors are expressed less frequently in the mock 
crime situations compared to the search (control) condition. Since lie detection research 
(Mann et al., 2004; The Global Deception Research Team, 2006; Sporer & Schwandt, 2007; 
Vrij, 2008) and our personal conversations with experienced police officers showed that 
professionals as well as laypeople believe that higher frequented self-adaptors are a sign of 
deception, we expected the actors to express more self-adaptors as offenders than as non-
offenders.  
A possible reason for this effect could lie in one of the three factors of the model by 
Zuckerman et al. (1981), namely attempted behavioral control. The underlying idea is that 
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liars try to control their nonverbal behavior to appear truthful or at least to not express any 
cues to their intention of deceiving. The results of our first experiment concerning moving 
patterns showed less deviation from the baseline in the crime conditions. Thus, it can be 
assumed that offenders tried to become one with the crowd and tried to act inconspicuously. 
Consequently, they tried to control their behavior. Since the offenders in Experiment 2 were 
exactly the same people in the same situation, it can be assumed to be true also for the 
expressed behaviors in this experiment. As the correlation between self-adaptors and 
nervousness as well as deception is a common belief in laypeople (e.g., Sporer & Schwandt, 
2007), we argue that our offenders were aware of the possibility to express self-adaptors, and 
that they believed that such behavioral cues would let them appear suspiciously. Thus, the 
emotional factor of Zuckerman et al.'s (1981) three factor model interacted with the attempted 
behavioral control factor. The result was that our mock offenders presumably tried hard to 
control their behavior that expresses their higher arousal. In other words, they tried to 
suppress self-adaptors (Sporer & Schwandt, 2007). However, if that is the case, why did they 
just suppress self-adaptors but not object-adaptors? Object-adaptors are not well known up to 
the present. Even though they have already been mentioned by Ekman and Friesen (1972), 
only the Heubrock group has studied them in more detail as far as we know. For that reason, 
offenders might not be aware of them being a cue. Consequently, they do not try to suppress 
them. Moreover, object-adaptors might let offenders feel that they become one with the 
crowd: at least, they seem to be engaging in something. Besides, object-adaptors might still 
counteract nervousness insofar that the hands are being used. Personal conversation with 
experienced police officers about modi operandi that are used for example by thieves, we 
learned that some of them use tricks like letting something fall right beside the victim to catch 
his/her attention so that the partner can steal the valuables. Thus, an object formerly used as 
adaptor might transform into a tool for committing the crime. Therefore, some offenders 
might carry objects that are useful for committing the crime, but during the build-up phase 
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they may use them to appear inconspicuously. Paradoxically, exactly this behavior might 
make them appear suspicious. This would explain the more frequently observed object-
adaptors during the build-up phase, and also the less frequently observed self-adaptors during 
the build-up phase.  
Self-adaptors are also signs of higher arousal that might be expressed more frequently 
in stress situations (e.g., Sporer & Schwandt, 2007). Thus, it appears also possible that the 
specific selection of our control condition was responsible for the rather surprising results. 
Since we used an active search for a (non-existing) person, the “actors” might have felt 
stressed during the search (control) condition because they did not manage to find the person 
they were looking for. Some “actors” might have had a very long build-up phase of the 
criminal act which lead to a longer search (control) condition, because both recordings had the 
same duration. Therefore, such offenders were observed longer during the search (control) 
condition and might have expressed more behavior related to stress, because they could not 
find the non-existing instructor. In this case, the attempted behavioral control factor did not 
interact with the emotional factor, because the “actors” had no need to hide their intention or 
to deceive somebody. Thus, the stressful situation might have resulted in the expression of 
more self-adaptors. The combination of stress-related behavior in the search (control) 
condition, and the interaction of higher arousal and attempted behavioral control during the 
mock crime condition might have resulted in more frequently shown self-adaptors during the 
search (control) condition. 
Similar to Experiment 1, we asked participants in Experiment 2 to also mention which 
kind of object-adaptors and self-adaptors they observed in the persons of interest. For object-
adaptors, the data show a clear pattern: every kind of object-adaptor was significantly more 
often observed in the mock crime condition than in the search (control) condition. For self-
adaptors, the pattern appears more unclear. The only significant difference was found for 
Chapter 3 – What is suspicious when trying to be inconspicuous? 
 
87   
 
hands in hair insofar, that this adaptor was more often observed in the mock crime condition. 
After the results from the overall cluster of behaviors of interest, we would have expected 
significant differences in the direction of being less often observed in mock crime conditions. 
A possible reason might be that we controlled for inter-individual differences. Thus, the 
explicit kinds of behavior (e.g., hands in face) might not be expressed that differently, but that 
the cluster of behavior self-adaptors might result in an observable difference. 
In general, the results of this pioneering study indicate that offender behavior during 
the build-up phase of a criminal act indeed is expressed differently compared to non-offender 
behavior. Along with the importance of controlling for inter-individual differences in future 
studies, our results also emphasize the high importance of the baseline construct and the 
ability to successfully establish and adapt a baseline. In other words, observers have to 
establish the baseline and continuously recheck whether it has changed. During the build-up 
phase, observers are able to continuously create and update a baseline of nonverbal behavior 
in the current situational area because bystanders do not have any hidden criminal intentions 
and therefore show unaltered behavior. This might be an explanation for the contradictory 
results documented in research on the ability of detecting lies (see Vrij, 2008, for review) and 
research on the ability of detecting suspicious behavior during the build-up phase (Troscianko 
et al., 2004; Heubrock et al., 2009a; Baettig et al., 2011). As mentioned before, several 
differences exist between an interrogation setting and the build-up phase of a criminal act. In 
interrogation settings, both truth-tellers and liars might alter their behavior (DePaulo et al., 
2003; Strömwall et al., 2006) and might feel similar emotions for different reasons (J. K. 
Burgoon et al., 2009; Vrij, Granhag, & Porter, 2010). This will cause differences due to 
deception to appear very small only, as can be seen in the small effect sizes of the significant 
findings in DePaulo et al.'s (2003) meta-analysis. Based on all those differences, it makes 
sense to exert utmost caution in using nonverbal behavioral cues to deception for lie detection 
purposes. Detecting criminal intentions during the build-up phase of a criminal act, however, 
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should be seen as really different for several reasons: Firstly, the tasks of the liar or the 
criminal before the act differ because a liar directly communicates with the interviewer while 
the offender during the build-up phase tries to act inconspicuously to slip the security 
personnel’s attention. Secondly, people are able to detect or predict criminal acts in 
aggressive, unlawful acts (Troscianko et al., 2004), as well as in deceptive, unlawful acts, 
such as thefts and most terrorist acts (Heubrock et al., 2009a; Baettig et al., 2011; Frey et al., 
submitted). Thirdly, observers always have an adequate baseline or guideline to judge 
nonverbal behavioral cues as suspicious or not, which interviewers facing liars are lacking. 
Our results show that some nonverbal behavioral cues, which are expressed due to 
criminal intentions, can indeed be recognized. This is true as long as clusters of behaviors are 
observed and compared to a baseline. This baseline can either be established from the crowd 
of bystanders or from the observed person itself in a lawful, comparable situation. We could 
further show that laypeople indeed show similar moving and communication patterns as 
professional offenders. Therefore, our results have high ecological validity. We also found 
nonverbal behavioral cues to suspicious behavior or criminal intentions to be independent of 
the crime as long as they were compared to a baseline or as long as inter-individual 
differences are controlled for. 
Apart from the limitation that our analyses are based on 13 actors and 23 professional 
thieves from ten authentic CCTV recordings only, our results are of high practical and 
theoretical relevance for two reasons. Firstly, they show the importance of creating and using 
a baseline before judging nonverbal behavior as cues to criminal intentions. Some nonverbal 
behaviors (e.g., abrupt direction changes), which are also mentioned by professionals as cue 
to criminal intentions, might be more useful and typical for some situational areas than for 
others. Secondly, our analyses show that there is not just a typical nonverbal behavior that can 
be labeled clearly (e.g., abrupt changes in direction or using a cellphone without instrumental 
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goal), but that it is rather a cluster of nonverbal behaviors (e.g., moving patterns or object-
adaptors) that always needs to be compared to an adequate baseline. Therefore, teaching 
behavior detection officers and police officers possible nonverbal behavioral cues to criminal 
intentions only does not suffice. They need to know as well what a baseline is, and how it can 
best be established. As a last step, they need to bring together the observed nonverbal 
behavioral cues and the baseline. SPOT (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010) is a 
good example that features all these three elements. 
Although, there is still more research needed to extract and define more nonverbal 
behavioral cues to hidden criminal intentions during the build-up phase, this study could show 
that using behavior detection during the build-up phase as one leg in counterterrorism and 
preventative police work is a promising step forward.  
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4 General Discussion 
4.1  Summary 
The two reported empirical studies filled the lack of scientific research concerning the 
detection of criminal intentions during the build-up phase of a criminal act. In the first 
pioneering study (“Who’s the thief?” The influence of knowledge and experience on early 
detection of criminal intentions), we examined the influences of theoretical knowledge and 
work experience on the early detection of hidden criminal intentions. The results suggested 
that the different stages of expertise, theoretical knowledge and work experience both 
influence detection performance positively. But, hidden criminal intentions can already be 
detected without special knowledge at the end of the build-up phase, because at that point 
even laypeople (i.e. psychology students and police recruits) performed above chance level. 
Still, inexperienced police officers, having only theoretical knowledge about how some 
crimes are committed, outperformed laypeople at all points during the build-up phase. The 
special work experience of criminal investigators then increased performance even more.  
To examine what kind of behavior is suspicious (i.e. might help in detecting criminals 
early on in the build-up phase of their criminal act), we conducted the second reported study 
(What is suspicious when trying to be inconspicuous? Criminal intentions inferred from 
nonverbal behavioral cues). The results of that study support the belief that hidden criminal 
intentions lead to nonverbal behavior differing from that of non-suspicious individuals that 
might trigger suspiciousness. The use of a search task as control condition showed that the 
suspicious behavior is not mere search behavior due to looking for the perfect victim or place. 
Rather we found for almost all behaviors of interest (e.g. moving patterns in space, object- 
and self-adaptors) significant deviation between nonverbal behavior underlying hidden 
criminal intentions and nonverbal behavior expressed during the search of a person in both 
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experiments. The only exception concerned communication behavior. We assume that the 
need for communication was similar in all conditions (search, mock crime and real crime) due 
to the search included in all three tasks. In other words, searching somebody in the search 
condition might need a similar kind and amount of nonverbal communication behavior as 
during the preparation of a crime, for example, head signs and hand signs. Our results are 
even more relevant as inter-personal differences were controlled for (i.e. we compared the 
same people in the mock crime and search condition). Thus, trying to behave unsuspiciously 
in order to hide a criminal intention indeed alters nonverbal behavior. The first experiment of 
this study was conducted to examine whether moving patterns in space deviate differently 
from the baseline (how bystanders behave in the same situational area without the same task) 
when trying to be unsuspicious compared to when somebody is searched for: The deviation 
from the baseline was less strong for offender conditions than for search conditions. This 
lends support to the idea of attempted behavioral control from Zuckerman et al.'s (1981) three 
factor model: offenders might try to become one with the crowd. Furthermore, the results 
show that, as far as moving patterns and communication behavior are concerned, our self-
made recordings are not different from the authentic CCTV recordings and therefore seem to 
be comparable to real thefts. 
The second experiment of this study was conducted to address object- and self-
adaptors as behaviors of interest. Only self-made recordings were used, because object- and 
self-adaptors were not observable in CCTV recordings due to the low quality and distance 
recording and it should be controlled for inter-personal differences. The results showed a 
deviation in behavior due to the hidden criminal intention for both behaviors of interest. 
Object-adaptors were shown more strongly in the mock crime condition than in the search 
condition and self-adaptors were shown less strongly in the mock crime condition. Based on 
the results of the first experiment where offenders seem to try to merge into the crowd (less 
strong deviation from the baseline than in the search condition), we assume that people might 
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use object-adaptors to appear busy and right at place. On the other hand, they might have the 
usual belief that self-adaptors are signs for nervousness (e.g. Sporer & Schwandt, 2007) and 
might let them appear suspicious. Thus, they try to control their behavior and show less self-
adaptors in the mock crime condition than in the search condition. 
4.2  Future directions 
The central question I addressed in this thesis was whether scientific support to the 
basic three assumptions underlying an effective behavior detection program can be found: (1) 
offenders’ hidden criminal intentions must be displayed in nonverbal behavior that triggers 
suspiciousness, (2) observers must be able to infer hidden criminal intentions based on 
nonverbal behavioral cues, and (3) the detection of hidden criminal intentions during the 
build-up phase of a criminal act must be teachable and trainable. For all three assumptions the 
answer is yes - at least to some extent.  
Our second study showed promising results with respect to the first assumption: 
offenders’ hidden criminal intentions are expressed in nonverbal behavior, and this nonverbal 
behavior serves as cues for identification. As the first study indicated, this early identification 
/ detection performance is positively influenced by theoretical knowledge about how a 
criminal act might be managed. But also (specific) work experience in the field of criminal 
investigation increases early detection rates. Also the second and third assumptions are met: 
Early detection of hidden criminal intentions based on nonverbal behavioral cues is possible 
and it is teachable and trainable, because the different career stages of police officers led to 
improvements in detection performance. 
Even though the second study about diagnostic nonverbal behavioral cues reported 
here showed promising results, further research is needed. Only four kinds of nonverbal 
behaviors were addressed, because they were most present in the conversations I had with 
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criminal investigators. But, behavior detection programs are based on many more behaviors 
of interest (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010) that need further investigation. The 
first step towards clarifying the usefulness of these nonverbal behavioral cues would be to 
create good recordings including control for inter-individual differences. Thus, control for 
possible overestimation or underestimation of cues due to the comparison of different people 
in the crime and control condition. To increase and/or control ecological validity, more 
openness between countries concerning CCTV recordings of real terrorist attacks or criminal 
acts would be welcomed.  
In the first empirical study reported in this thesis, criminal investigators outperformed 
inexperienced police officers and laypeople without being able to label exactly what they are 
looking for, i.e. which cues they used for their conclusion about suspects. Their excellent 
performance, however, clearly indicates that they consider the relevant cues in the recordings. 
Therefore, the next step will be to investigate what kind of eye gaze pattern is helpful or 
needed in correctly identifying deceptive offenders during the build-up phase. Howard, 
Troscianko, Gilchrist, Behera, and Hogg (2013) provided evidence that trained CCTV 
operators showed greater between-observer consistency of gaze locations and perceived 
suspiciousness in dynamic scenes. Thus, CCTV operators seem to know what to look for. The 
task in this work was to mention whenever something triggers suspiciousness, but there were 
no real crimes to be observed and therefore no “objective” measure for a good observer. In a 
study concerning the prediction of antisocial, unlawful acts the visual scan paths of laypeople 
and CCTV operators did not differ significantly (Grant & Williams, 2011). However, this 
does not surprise as much as the prediction performance of laypeople and CCTV operators 
was on chance level for both groups. 
 In an own attempt we will therefore combine a behavior detection task with eye-
tracking measurement and decide afterwards, based on the detection performance, which 
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persons are good behavior detectors and whose performance was rather poor. Then, in a 
second step, we will compare the eye-gaze patterns of the good detectors with the eye-gaze 
patterns of the poor detectors. Difference between eye-gaze patterns might then be taken as 
indicators for which behavioral cues are diagnostic (e.g. on which parts of the body did they 
fixate when answering correctly; Grant & Williams, 2011). Moreover, we would like to 
further investigate whether the poor detectors can learn how to look correctly when showing 
them  the scan paths of good detectors (e.g. Neuberger & Körber, 2009). 
At the same time, in current behavior detection programs, such as SPOT (Frank et al., 
2009; U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010), observers are trained to look for many 
different possible diagnostic nonverbal behavioral cues. It is therefore necessary to further 
investigate how to teach behavior detection best. Behavior detection officers, trained 
according to the SPOT program, currently learn the concept of a baseline and to make use of 
it. Additionally, they are taught many diagnostic behavioral cues they have to look for in 
passengers (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010). Other projects, such as the 
Griffin Project (City of London Police, 2014), are based on raising awareness in all people 
and show them where to go if they see something that triggers their suspiciousness. For the 
effectiveness of these programs to be judged adequately it is of crucial relevance to find out 
whether it is necessary to teach exact and scientifically revealed diagnostic cues, or whether it 
is enough to teach the baseline concept and raise general awareness in the observers. Based on 
the second study reported in this thesis, we assume that it is a combination of both, the 
concept of a baseline and nonverbal behavioral cues. However, based on our results, we 
emphasize the importance of teaching clusters of nonverbal behavioral cues, such as moving 
patterns instead of the exact behavior (e.g. abrupt changes in directions). Moreover, the 
second study revealed that the actual suspicious behavior results in a deviation from the 
baseline dependent of offender and crime even in both directions. Consequently, we assume 
the most important part of teaching behavior detection during the build-up phase is teaching 
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the concept of a baseline and raise awareness that if the taught clusters of behaviors deviate 
from that baseline in either direction this should raise suspiciousness.  
4.3  Conclusion 
The pioneering empirical studies reported in this thesis contribute scientific support to 
the assumption that behavior detection programs might indeed be effective. Early detection of 
hidden criminal intentions during the build-up phase of a criminal act based on nonverbal 
behavior is possible. Moreover, the detection performance is increased by theoretical 
knowledge from police school as well as specific work experience in the field of criminal 
investigation. Further research is needed to identify the exact processes underlying observers’ 
performance and diagnostic nonverbal behavioral cues to hidden criminal intentions during 
the build-up phase.  
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